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THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial disqualification is hot-a phrase that, until recently,
was likely turned only in sparsely attended conferences of lonely
ethicists and marginalized proceduralists. Throughout the past
decade, organizations such as the American Bar Association, the
American Judicature Society, the Brennan Center for Justice, and the
Justice at Stake Campaign have focused on disqualification
problems,' and law review articles have covered the issue like
kudzu.2 A focal point has been the litigation in Caperton v. A. T.
Massey Company, which spanned the better part of the last decade.
It began in 2002, when a coal company lost a $50 million verdict in a
West Virginia jury trial.3 While an appeal of that verdict was
impending, the company's CEO spent $3 million on a supreme court
race to replace a disfavored incumbent with someone more to his
liking. The incoming justice declined to recuse himself from hearing
the case and cast the deciding vote in the coal company's favor.4
1. Judicial Disqualification After Caperton, 93 JUDICATURE 4 (2009);
JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS (2008), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/fair-courtssetting recusal standa
rds (reporting broadly on threats to impartiality of courts posed by lack of viable
recusal systems); see generally Caperton v. Massey Resource Page, JUSTICE AT
STAKE CAMPAIGN, http://justiceatstake.org/resources/in depth-issues guides/
caperton resourcepage/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the
Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARv. L. REV. 80 (2009) (discussing what Caperton v.
Massey Coal Co. means for judicial elections and judicial regulation of politics);
Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 104 (2009) (discussing the problem of "practical dependence" that occurs
when judges rely on campaign contributions to secure their positions on the
bench); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense
Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV.
LITIG. 249 (2010) (criticizing "serious risk of actual bias" test established by
Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules
Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 335,
353-54 (2010) (discussing the potential bias inherent in today's court system);
Penny J. White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARv. L. REV. 120, 134-36
(2009) (discussing the constitutionality of judicial elections in light of cases like
Caperton).




John Grisham used the episode as fodder for his latest novel,
editorial writers were apoplectic, and in 2009, a closely divided
United States Supreme Court ruled that the justice's failure to step
aside violated the plaintiff s due process rights. 6
While Caperton may be the flagship, there is a multitude of
vessels in the flotilla of recent disqualification activity. In 1999, the
American Bar Association revised its Model Code of Judicial
Conduct to disqualify judges from hearing cases involving
significant campaign contributors.7 In 2003, the ABA revised its
disqualification rule again, this time to disqualify judges from cases
in which they had made prior public statements committing
themselves to decide issues then before them in particular ways. In
2004, Justice Scalia prompted a media outcry when he declined to
disqualify himself from hearing a case in which Vice President Dick
Cheney was a named party, after flying with the Vice President on a
government jet to Louisiana for a weekend of duck hunting, while
the appeal was pending.9 Likewise in 2004, a newly elected Illinois
Supreme Court justice provoked media ire after he declined to
disqualify himself from hearing a case in which a corporate
defendant and its employees had made significant contributions to
his election campaign while the appeal was pending. 10 In 2005, that
same justice cast the deciding vote in the defendant's favor." In
2006, the New York Times ran an expos6 on Ohio judges who
received sizable contributions to their reelection campaigns from
5. See The Grisham Connection, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/in depthissuesguides/caperton resource
page/thegrisham_connection.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011) (discussing
Grisham's inspiration for his novel The Appeal).
6. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264-66.
7. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(e) (2004).
8. Id. at Canon 3E(1)(f).
9. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court's Honor at Stake, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Mar. 19, 2004, at 20; Editorial, Duck Blinded: Scalia's Trip Doesn't Pass
Smell Test, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 19, 2004, at 12A; Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12; Editorial, Position Looks Compromising, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 3, 2004, at 16A; Editorial, Scalia's Conflict
of Interest, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at B-07; Editorial, Scalia Tries To Duck
Conflict With Waterfowl Reasoning, TAMPA TRIB. (Fla.), Jan. 26, 2004, at 18.
10. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David Pozen, The Best Defense:
Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 509-
11(2007).
11. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
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lawyers and parties appearing before them, concluding that "[i]n the
215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest, justices
recused themselves just 9 times." 2 In 2007, the ABA's Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence launched a Judicial
Disqualification Project to evaluate state judicial disqualification
around the country and recommend reforms.' 3 In 2009, the House
Judiciary Committee held oversight hearings on federal judicial
disqualification.14 In 2010, the House of Representatives impeached
Louisiana District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, in part for failing to
disqualify himself from a case in which he had solicited money from
an attorney in a pending case.' 5 That same year, the national media
reported on the non-disqualification of federal judges assigned to
hear cases arising out of the BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico,
despite their ownership of petroleum company stock and mineral
rights in lands leased to petroleum companies.16  And, the West
Virginia high court was back in the news when a justice initially
declined to disqualify himself from a case concerning the
constitutionality of a statute he had committed himself to uphold as a
judicial candidate, and then angrily disqualified himself later when
his non-disqualification was widely reported and criticized. 7
Why the recent interest? Explanations tend to be piecemeal,
with commentators delineating the scope of the problem with
reference to whatever subtopic they are addressing: personal
12. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, § 1, at 11, available at 2006 WLNR 16983797.
13. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously,
92 JUDICATURE 12 (2008).
14. Examining the State ofJudicial Recusals After Caperton v. A.T. Massey:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 111-18 (2009).
15. H.R. Res. 1031, 111th Cong. (2010); see also David Ingram, House
Impeaches Federal Judge, 121 FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. 13 (2010) (describing
House debate on the impeachment of Judge Porteous).
16. Charlie Savage, Drilling Ban Blocked; US. Will Issue New Order, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2010, at Al; Laurel Brubaker Calkins and Jef Feeley, BP,
Transocean Spill Suits Shunned by Gulf-State Judges Citing Conflicts,
BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-01/bp-
transocean-spill-suits-shunned-by-gulf-state-judges-citing-conflicts.html.
17. Tony Mauro, New Recusal Controversy in West Virginia High Court,





relationships are inadequately regulated by disqualification rules;' 8
particular judges do not understand how the public perceives their
relationships;' 9 judges are not concerned enough about appearance
problems;20 judges are too concerned about appearance problems;21
contested judicial elections cause judges to take positions that
compromise their impartiality;22 privately funded judicial campaigns
infuse big money into judicial races and create the perception that
judges are influenced by the support they receive.23
The composite picture suggests that something more is afoot.
In this article, I argue that the dominant regime that has structured
judicial disqualification in the state and federal courts for nearly
forty years (the last time judicial disqualification was hot) is
crumbling, and the struggle for a successor regime has begun. My
threefold purpose here is to explain why the prevailing regime is in
trouble; to survey the field of new-regime wannabes; and to identify
the likely frontrunner and assess its long-term prospects.
In Part II, I survey the history of judicial disqualification to
the end of identifying four distinct regimes. The first was
characterized by an almost ironclad presumption of impartiality; at
common law, courts refused to entertain even the possibility of
judicial bias. The second regime, which gradually intruded upon the
monopoly of the first, carved out exceptions to the presumption of
impartiality, in which judges were required to disqualify themselves
when confronted with specifically enumerated conflicts of interest.
The third regime, which held sway briefly, explored a procedural
approach to disqualification that called upon judges to recuse
themselves automatically if aggrieved parties made specified
allegations pursuant to specified procedures. The fourth and current
18. Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a
Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REv. 575, 579 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Editorial, Honest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at A26;
Editorial, Justice Scalia's Misjudgment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/opinion/25SUN3.html.
20. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting
More Attention to the Deciders, supra note 2, at 353-54.
21. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit ofActual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1, 5-6
(2007).
22. Rachel Paine Caulfield, In the Wake of White: How States Are
Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial
Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REv. 625, 635 (2005).
23. Meryl Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Elections in the States, 42 MCGEORGE
L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
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regime dwells upon appearances, by organizing disqualification
standards around the principle that a judge should step aside when
her impartiality "might reasonably be questioned"-in other words,
when she might appear less than impartial to a reasonable person.
Although each regime has superseded its predecessor as an
organizing principle for judicial disqualification, the vestiges-
sometimes substantial-of former regimes remain in place,
coexisting peacefully at some times and uneasily at others.
In Part III, I address the state of the current appearances
regime. On the one hand, in principle, the legal establishment's
commitment to preserving the appearance of justice remains strong.
On the other hand, the appearances-based disqualification regime is
in trouble. For an appearances regime to succeed, I argue, it is not
enough that the legal establishment and the public agree that the
judiciary should strive to preserve the appearance of impartiality.
Rather, they must share a basic understanding of what constitutes an
appearance of partiality. Currently, the legal establishment is deeply
divided over when it is reasonable for the presumption of
impartiality to yield to the suspicion that extralegal influences may
have compromised the judge's impartial judgment. The general
public is comparably divided, and between the legal establishment
and the general public, there are still further divisions. The net effect
is that except in extreme or well-settled cases, consensus on when it
is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a judge is elusive-
we do not know it when we see it.
Ultimately, then, recent interest in disqualification rules is
emblematic of a larger struggle within the legal establishment over
how best to preserve the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, at a time
when our collective understanding of what properly influences
judicial decision-making, and what perverts it, is unclear. In Part IV,
I survey the field of potential successors to the appearances regime-
each of which aims to retool or revitalize a predecessor regime-and
conclude that a revamped procedural regime is the front-runner. At a
time when disqualification standards are in flux (and achieving
consensus on what those standards should be is thus impossible),
seeking to enhance the legitimacy of disqualification practice
through procedural reform makes sense. Moreover, procedural
reform aimed at providing litigants with a fairer-seeming
disqualification process may promote public confidence in ways that
an appearance-based regime has not. That said, the future of a
676 [ Vol. 3 0: 4
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nascent procedural regime remains unclear because judges remain
ambivalent about disqualification and could thwart it as they have
the implementation of prior regimes.
II. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
The history of judicial disqualification, while interesting in
its own right, is recounted here for the purpose of identifying four
distinct disqualification regimes that have achieved prominence at
different times. Each regime brought a different approach to bear
that has taken its turn to dominate legal discourse on disqualification
problems. New regimes, however, have not replaced the old, but
have been built upon the foundations of their predecessors-meaning
that the ruins of prior regimes have remained integral to the
permanent disqualification landscape. Moreover, the current
disqualification reform agenda, discussed in Part IV, is constituted
largely of proposals to revise or resuscitate prior regimes. As a
consequence, the current problems and proposed solutions can be
better understood in historical context.
A. Regime 1: Common Law Presumption ofImpartiality
The practice of judicial disqualification is old indeed. Under
Roman law, litigants were entitled to petition for the disqualification
of judges who were "under suspicion." In 530 A.D., the Justinian
Code provided:
It is the clearest right under general provisions laid
down from thy exalted seat, that before hearings
litigants may recuse judges. A judge being so
recused, the parties have to resort to chosen
arbitrators, before whom they assert their rights.
Although a judge has been appointed by imperial
power yet because it is our pleasure that all litigations
should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted
to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion to
recuse him before issue be joined, so that the cause go
Symposium 2011] 677
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to another; the right to recuse having been held out to
1 4him ...
So generous an approach to disqualification for perceived
bias, while embraced by civil law systems, did not take root in
English common law. William Blackstone acknowledged "civil and
canon laws," under which "a judge might be refused upon any
suspicion of partiality," but wrote that in England "the law is
otherwise," and "it is held that judges or justices cannot be
challenged.",2 5 This early difference in approach may be attributable
to the different roles of the judge in civil and common law systems.
Civil law judges are fact-finders. Common law judges are not. In
common law systems, fact-finding is delegated to jurors who, like
judges in civil law systems, have long been subject to
disqualification for bias. 26  With a wink of reassurance to the
worried, common law commentators noted that isolated episodes of
judicial bias could be remedied by impeachment (of rogue judges) or
appeal (to correct bias-caused error) but otherwise adopted a nearly
ironclad presumption of impartiality for judges.27 As Blackstone
24. CODEX OF JUSTINIAN, Book III, title 1, No. 16.
25. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, III COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
361 (1768).
26. LILLIAN B. HARDWICK & B. LEE WARE, JUROR MISCONDUCT § 3.03[4]
(2005).
27. Blackstone regarded judicial disqualification for bias as unnecessary,
given the availability of impeachment because "such misbehaviour would draw
down a heavy censure from those, to whom the judge is accountable for his
conduct." BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 361. Writing during the 19th century,
the California Supreme Court, in turn, saw judicial disqualification for bias as
unnecessary, given the availability of appeal:
The law establishes a different rule for determining the qualification of
Judges from that applied to jurors. The reason of this distinction is
obvious. The province of the jury is, to determine from the evidence the
issues of fact presented by the parties; and their decision is final in all
cases where there is a conflict of testimony. Therefore, the expression of
an unqualified opinion on the merits of the controversy, which evinces
such a form of mind as renders him less capable to weigh the evidence
with entire impartiality, is sufficient to exclude a juror.
The province of a Judge is to decide such questions of law as may
arise in the progress of the trial. His decisions upon these points are not
678 [ Vol. 30:4
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wrote: "[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in
a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and
whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea." 28
Blackstone's observation that the judge's authority "greatly
depends" on a presumption of impartiality, underscores the centrality
of impartiality to the common law judge's self-identity. Further
punctuating that point is Sir Matthew Hale's "Rules for His Judicial
Guidance, Things Necessary to be Continually Had in
Remembrance"-a code of judicial conduct that Hale drafted in the
17th century, as Lord Chief Justice under King Charles 11.29 Of
eighteen points in Hale's code, seven elaborated on the need for a
judge to remain impartial. 30 To challenge a judge for bias was, in
effect, to accuse him of abdicating his role-an accusation that
common law courts simply would not tolerate.
B. Regime 2: Statutory Conflicts ofInterest
Under English common law, recusal was a distinctly limited
practice guided by a single, pithy principle first announced in 1609
by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham 's Case: "No man shall be a
final; and, if erroneous, the party has his remedy by bill of exceptions and
appeal.
McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 523-24 (1859).
28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 361.
29. See LORD J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 207-
09 (1873) (quoting Hale's code ofjudicial conduct).
30. Id.
4. That in the execution of justice I carefully lay aside my own
passions .... 6. That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any
judgment at all, till the whole business, and both parties be heard. 7.
That I never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve
myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard.... 10. That I be not biassed
[sic] with compassion to the poor, or favor to the rich . . . . 11. That
popular or court applause, or distaste, have no influence into anything I
do in point of distribution of justice. 12. Not to be solicitous of what
men will say or think, so long as I keep myself exactly according to the
rules of justice. . . . 16. To abhor all private solicitations . . . in matters
depending.
Id.
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judge in his own case." 31 While a judge could not be challenged on
grounds of bias, he could be recused for having an "interest" in the
cases he decided. Thus, in Dr. Bonham's Case, a judge was
disqualified from a case in which he would receive the fines he
assessed.32 As one commentator has put it: "English common law
practice at the time of the establishment of the American court
system was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial
interest. No other disqualifications were permitted, and bias ... was
rejected entirely."33
The distinction between bias and interest was an important
one because disqualifying a judge for a conflict of interest averted
the need to address actual partiality. Under circumstances in which a
conflict of interest was present, disqualification was necessary,
without regard to whether the judge was biased in fact, or could and
would have set the conflict to one side and ruled impartially.
Under the common law, financial conflicts of interest were a
discrete exception to a regime that presumed judicial impartiality. In
the United States, however, state legislatures assumed control of
disqualification early on by specifying and expanding upon the
conflicts of interest that would require recusal, and courts reoriented
their focus from the common law to those enactments. 34 The net
effect was to create a new disqualification regime that increasingly
governed recusal with reference to this list of conflicts, rather than
the common law.
The federal system likewise was distinguished by an
emerging statutory regime of conflicts of interest. In 1792, Congress
enacted legislation (that would gradually evolve into what is
currently 28 U.S.C. § 455) that codified the common law by calling
31. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (1609).
32. Id. at 649, 653.
33. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611-12
(1947). Frank reported that at common law, disqualification did not extend to
cases in which the judge was related to one of the parties. There appears to be
some disagreement on that score. See, e.g., Turner v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 619,
626 (Ky. 1859) ("At common law, there were but two objections that went to the
disqualification of a judge to try a cause, to wit: interest in his own behalf in the
result, or being of kin to others interested therein.").
34. E.g., Turner, 59 Ky. at 624-27; McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 523-24
(Cal. 1859); Peck v. Freeholders of Essex, 20 N.J.L. 457, 466-67 (N.J. 1845);
Thomas v. State, 6 Miss. 20, 29-31 (Miss. 1840); Jim v. State, 3 Mo. 147, 147
(Mo. 1832).
680 [ Vol. 30:4
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for disqualification of district judges who were "concerned in
interest" but added that a judge could also be disqualified if he "has
been of counsel for either party." 35 In 1821, relationship to a party
was added as another ground for disqualification.36 In 1891,
Congress enacted legislation (later codified at 28 U.S.C. § 47)
forbidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that the judge
tried.37 In 1911, the precursor to § 455 was further amended to
require disqualification where the judge was a material witness in the
case. 38
C. Regime 3: An Experiment with Disqualification
Procedure
A conflicts-based disqualification regime, read in tandem
with the common law's presumption of impartiality, made no room
for disqualification on grounds of bias generally. Granted,
disqualification for conflicts of interest presupposed a risk of bias
that a conflicts regime sought to avoid. When no conflicts rule
applied, however, and the applicable disqualification statute was
silent as to bias or prejudice per se, the presumption of impartiality
filled the gap to foreclose disqualification on such grounds, despite
occasional recognition that judicial bias was a legitimate concern.
The California Supreme Court observed in 1859:
The exhibition by a Judge of partisan feeling, or the
unnecessary expression of an opinion upon the justice
or merits of a controversy, though exceedingly
indecorous, improper and reprehensible, as calculated
to throw suspicion upon the judgments of the Court
and bring the administration of justice into contempt,
are not, under our statute, sufficient to authorize a
change of venue on the ground that the Judge is
disqualified from sitting.39
35. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 178-79 (1792).
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (1821).
37. Act of July 30, 1894, ch. 172, § 2, 28 Stat. 161 (1894).
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (1911).
39. McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 523 (1859). See also Morris v. Graves,
2 Ind. 354, 357 (Ind. 1850) (holding that prejudice in the president judge is not
among the statutory causes for a change of venue); Inhabitants of Northampton v.
Smith, 52 Mass. 390, 396 (Mass. 1846). The Northampton court stated that:
68 1Symposium 2011]
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Even as the English common law evolved to acknowledge
disqualification for bias distinct from specific conflicts of interest,
American state courts remained largely unyielding absent an explicit
statutory directive.40
In the nineteenth century, a few jurisdictions provided for
bias-based disqualification. 4 1 Given the ethos of impartiality that
underlay the common law and judicial self-identity, it is
understandable that trial judges would be reluctant to admit
disqualifying bias and that appellate judges would be reluctant to
42
second-guess their brethren. A few states sought to circumvent this
It may be, and probably is, very true, as the human mind is constituted,
that an interest in a question or subject matter, arising from feeling and
sympathy, may be more efficacious in influencing the judgment, than
even a pecuniary interest; but an interest of such a character would be too
vague to serve as a test . . . it would not be capable of precise averment,
demonstration and proof; not visible, tangible, or susceptible of being put
in issue and tried; and therefore not certain enough to afford a practical
rule of action.
Northampton, 52 Mass. at 396.
40. Comment, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common
Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 OR. L. REv. 311,
322 (1969).
41. E.g., Massie v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W. 704, 704 (Ky. 1892) (stating that
if affidavits prove a judge is prejudiced against the defendant, he should vacate);
Conn v. Chadwick, 17 Fla. 428, 440 (Fla. 1880) (stating that an act of the
legislature, chapter 3120, provides that if a party in a suit pending in the supreme
court believes a judge to be prejudiced then the judge shall be disqualified from the
case); Hungerford v. Cushing, 2 Wis. 397, 5 (Wis. 1853) (quoting section one of
chapter ninety-five of the Revised Statutes, which states that a party in a civil suit
who believes the judge is prejudiced may request a change of venue).
42. Hungerford, 2 Wis. 397 at 3 (noting that statute authorized
disqualification for prejudice if the trial judge was "satisfied of the truth of the
allegations"). The Hungerford court held that the judge was "obliged to pass on
the state of his own mind or feelings" and rejected the claim that the judge should
"change the venue, if the facts contained in the affidavits are sufficient to satisfy a
reasonable mind that prejudice exists," because then "all would be made the
subjects of judicial investigation[.]" Id. at 5. See also Thomas v. State, 6 Miss.
20, 1840 WL 1620, at *7 (Miss. 1840) (declining to reverse non-disqualification
where the judge had previously served as counsel for the prosecution in that case
although "[t]he spirit of the law, the dignity of the state, and the reputation of the
judiciary demand purity in the arbiters, and impartiality in the administration of
justice," and stating reversal was unwarranted because "[t]here is no tribunal
682 [Vol. 30:4
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problem by adopting a procedural approach, whereby a party who
complied with specified procedures, sometimes including a facially
sufficient affidavit of bias against the judge, triggered
disqualification automatically.43 In 1911, Congress followed suit,
enacting legislation (later codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144) entitling a
party to secure the disqualification of a district judge by submitting
an affidavit that the judge had "a personal bias or prejudice" against
the affiant or for the opposing party.44 In 1921, in Berger v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this legislation
as written to prohibit the judge from ruling on the truth of matters
asserted in the affidavit supplied by the party seeking
disqualification and to require automatic disqualification if the
affidavit was facially sufficient.45
If judges remained ambivalent about disqualification for bias
generally, they were especially ambivalent about a procedure that
would subject judges to disqualification for alleged bias alone.46 A
procedural approach to judicial disqualification, however, proved to
be a two-way street. While the statute ostensibly forced
disqualification for alleged bias if the movant followed specified
procedures, the judges themselves decided when those procedures
were followed and, at the federal level at least, were ill-disposed to
interpret procedural requirements generously. As the First Circuit
explained with manifest pique, "courts have responded to the
draconian procedure-automatic transfer based solely on one side's
affidavit-by insisting on a firm showing in the affidavit that the
judge does have a personal bias or prejudice toward a party[.]" 4 7 A
adequate to decide a challenge to the judge when made in his own court" (quoting
Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stew. 442, 464 (Ala. 1828))).
43. Turner v. Commonwealth, 59 Ky. 619, 626-30 (Ky. 1859); McGoon v.
Little, 7 Ill. 42, 42-43 (Ill. 1845).
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 47 (2006)).
45. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35 (1921).
46. See, e.g., Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976) (adding to the
disqualification order that "[p]robably the district court is right that there is no
basis for the allegations" in the movant's affidavit, and expressing "sympathy with
district judges confronted with what they know to be groundless charges of
personal bias").
47. In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Because the statute 'is heavily
weighed in favor of recusal,' its requirements are to be strictly construed to prevent
abuse.").
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Federal Judicial Center monograph on judicial disqualification
summarizes the procedural impediments that have tripped up affiants
under § 144:
The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a
judge must step aside upon the filing of a facially
sufficient affidavit; but they have been exacting in
their interpretations of what a facially sufficient
affidavit requires and of the procedural prerequisites
to application of the statute. Thus, motions have been
dismissed for untimeliness; because the movant failed
to submit an affidavit, because the movant submitted
more than one affidavit, because the attorney rather
than a party submitted the affidavit or submitted more
than one affidavit; because the attorney rather than a
party submitted the affidavit; because the movant's
affidavit was unaccompanied by a certificate of
counsel or failed to make allegations with
particularity; and because the certificate of counsel
certified only to the affiant's-not counsel's-good
faith.48
By its 40th birthday, the statute was moribund. In a seminal
article on disqualification written in 1947, John Frank observed:
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected
through narrow construction of the phrase "bias and
prejudice." Affidavits are found not "legally
sufficient" on the ground that the specific acts
mentioned do not in fact indicate "bias and
prejudice," a reasoning which emasculates the Berger
decision by transferring the point of conflict.49
Frank warned that "unless and until the Supreme Court gives
new force and effect to the Berger decision the disqualification
48. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS
UNDER FEDERAL LAW 83-84 (2d ed. 2010), available at http://earth.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicialdq.pdf/$file/judicialdq.pdf.
49. Frank, supra note 33, at 629.
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practice of federal district courts will remain sharply limited."5 0 No
"new force and effect" was forthcoming. Section 144 remains on the
books to this day but has been so eclipsed by subsequent
amendments to § 455 that the Supreme Court remarked that § 144
"seems to be roperly invocable only when § 455(a) can be invoked
anyway. . . .'
Ultimately, the procedural approach embodied in § 144 may
be better cast as a failed experiment than a regime: It never had a
heyday. In the federal system, § 144 was quickly and quietly hoisted
on the petard of its own procedural requirements by unenthusiastic
52judges intent on marginalizing its impact. Among the states, the
legacy is more mixed. A significant number of jurisdictions-most
in the western half of the United States-have adopted some
variation of a procedural approach, enabling litigants to disqualify a
judge by correctly completing and submitting the required
paperwork 53 and in some cases making the necessary allegations of
bias, without having to prove them.54 Those jurisdictions, however,
remain in the minority, and even among them, some have interpreted
applicable procedural requirements strictly, thus following (to
varying degrees) in the footsteps of their federal counterpart.5 5
If one steps back, however, and looks at the state of
disqualification law as of the mid-twentieth century, a detectable
trajectory begins to emerge. The nearly ironclad presumption of
impartiality was gradually being eroded-first by a growing list of
exceptions for financial and relational conflicts of interest, and more
recently, by a patchwork of approaches to disqualify judges for bias
50. Id. at 630.
51. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
52. Frank, supra note 33, at 629.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (2010); ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 42(f)(1) (2010);
C.R.C.P. 97 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-7 (2010);
I.R.C.P. RULE 40(D)(1) (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1001 (2010); IND. R.
TRIAL P. 76 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 542.16 (2009); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 51.05 (2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (2010); NEV. S.C.R. 48.1 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§29-15-21 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 14.260 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-12-
21 (2010); URCP RULE 63 (2010); Wis. STAT. § 801.58 (2010); WYo. R. Clv.
PROC. RULE 40.1 (2010).
54. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170.6 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.12.050 (2009).
55. E.g., James W. Glover, Ltd. v. Fong, 39 Haw. 308, 314-15 (Haw. 1952);
Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Saul Subsidiary I, Ltd. P'ship, 159 S.W.3d 339, 341
(Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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that did not fall within the scope of specified conflicts. By 1968, a
majority of jurisdictions made some provision to disqualify judges
for bias. 56 The multiplicity of approaches those states employed,
however, reflected the ongoing search for an acceptable regime.
Some states made no statutory or constitutional provision to
disqualify judges for bias or prejudice. Among those states, some
courts fell back on the common law rule and did not disqualify for
bias, while other courts filled the gap with a disqualification rule of
their own.5 7 Other states disqualified judges for bias by statute or
under the state constitution. Of those, some placed a burden on the
movant to show bias, others required a facially sufficient, factually
specific affidavit alleging bias, while still others simply entitled
litigants to seek a substitution of judge with or without a generally
worded affidavit attesting to the affiant's belief that he would not
receive a fair hearing before the judge in question.59
D. Regime 4: The Appearance ofPartiality
In a seminal address to the American Bar Association in
1906, entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Courts," Roscoe Pound called attention to "the real and serious
dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law which exists in
the United States today."60 Two years later, American Bar
Association President Jacob M. Dickinson echoed that "U]udicial
judgments are not accorded the same respect as formerly" and that
"not a court but the courts are frequently and fiercely attacked"; the
net effect, he concluded, was "to destroy confidence in the courts
and to make a subservient judiciary."61
One of the legal establishment's primary responses to this
public confidence problem was to approach it as a public relations
problem. As such, it was not enough for judges to be fair, impartial,
56. Comment, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common
Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 OR. L. REV. 311,
332 (1969).
57. Id. at 347, tbl.1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts,
reprinted in 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 178 (1936).
61. Address of the President, 33 REPORT OF THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 341 (1908).
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and just; they must appear so to the public. In 1924, the American
Bar Association adopted Canons of Judicial Ethics that exhorted
judges to avoid appearance problems that could compromise public
confidence in the courts. Canon four provided that a judge's conduct
should be "free from . .. the appearance of impropriety."62 Eleven
additional canons warned judges to avoid behavior that could create
"suspicion" of misbehavior or "misconceptions" of the judicial role
that might "appear" or "seem" to interfere with judicial duties or that
could "create the impression" of bias.63
This newfound desire to avoid appearance problems did not
lead the authors of the Canons to call for disqualification when a
judge was or appeared to be biased, but it laid the foundation for
such a move later. In 1955, the Supreme Court described the "fair
tribunal" to which litigants were entitled, with reference to the
absence of bias and apparent bias:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence
62. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4
(1924).
63. Id. Canon nineteen opined that to "avoid[] the suspicion of arbitrary
conclusion [and] promote[] confidence in his judicial integrity," judges should
explain the basis for their rulings. Canon twenty-four encouraged a judge not to
incur obligations that would "appear to interfere with his devotion to the
expeditious and proper administration of his official functions." Canon twenty-
five urged a judge to avoid creating "any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing
the power or prestige of his office" to advance his private interests. Canon twenty-
six counseled the judge against maintaining relationships that would "arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment." Canon twenty-seven
declared that a judge should refrain from holding fiduciary positions that would
seem to "interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties." Canon
twenty-eight warned judges against engaging in political activities that could give
rise to the "suspicion of being warped by political bias." Canon thirty advised a
candidate for judicial office to do nothing "to create the impression that if chosen,
he will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination."
Canon thirty-one provided that in jurisdictions where judges were authorized to
practice law part-time, the judge should not "seem[] to utilize his judicial position
to further his professional success." In Canon thirty-three, the judge was
encouraged to avoid conduct that could "awaken the suspicion that his social or
business relations or friendships, constitute an element in influencing his judicial
conduct." Canon thirty-four provided that "in every particular [a judge's] conduct
should be above reproach." And Canon thirty-five observed that allowing cameras
in the courtroom "create[s] misconceptions . . . in the mind of the public and
should not be permitted." Id.
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of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. . . . Such a stringent rule
may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual
bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties.
But to perform its high function in the best way
"justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."64
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., in which the Court held
that an arbitrator's "appearance of bias" subjected him to
disqualification.65 In 1969, judicial disqualification made national
headlines, when the United States Senate rejected President Nixon's
nomination of Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court, at least in
part because Haynsworth, as a circuit judge, had not disqualified
himself from participating in several cases in which he owned stock
or had some other ownership interest in a corporate party or its
parent.66 While Haynsworth's stock holdings were small, Senators
complained that his sitting on the cases in question conflicted with
the "appearance of justice."67
Shortly after the Haynsworth episode, Senator Birch Bayh
introduced legislation to amend § 455 by requiring disqualification
from any case in which the judge's participation would "create an
appearance of impropriety."68 Meanwhile, the American Bar
Association established a Special Committee on Standards of
Conduct, which promulgated a new disqualification rule in 1972, as
part of a larger project to replace the Canons of Judicial Ethics with a
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 69 The Special Committee took its
cue from the "appearance of bias" standard adopted by the Supreme
Court four years earlier in Commonwealth Coatings, concluding that
64. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citation omitted).
65. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49
(1968).
66. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARv. L. REV. 736, 736 n.2 (1973).
67. John Frank, Disqualification ofJudges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 60 (1970).
68. Id. at 68.




"[i]t can be said with certainty that the same standard would be
applied by the Supreme Court to a judge . . . under similar
circumstances." 70 Accordingly, the new rule required judges to
disqualify themselves both when they had a "personal bias" and
when their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
This reform movement occurred against the backdrop of
longstanding and ongoing judicial ambivalence over disqualification
generally and disqualification for bias in particular, which, as
previously discussed, had been in perpetual tension with the ancient
presumption of impartiality. 72 In 1964, The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pushed back against over-
disqualification with the so-called "duty to sit," declaring that "It is a
judge's duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally
his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation." In
1972, Justice William Rehnquist reported that the duty to sit had
been accepted by all circuit courts and cited that duty in support of
his decision not to disqualify himself from a case then before the
Supreme Court. 74  In that case, he, as Assistant Attorney General
under President Nixon, testified before a Senate Subcommittee on
the district court's opinion in that case and expressed his view that
the case was non-justiciable.7 5
In 1974, Congress, agitated over the Rehnquist imbroglio,
sided with the ABA and adopted the 1972 Model Code's
appearances-based disqualification rule as an amendment to § 455.76
By virtue of its requirement that judges disqualify themselves when
their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the amendment
was represented as ending the "duty to sit."77 In 1990, and again in
70. Id. at 60-61.
71. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972).
72. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
73. Edwards v. United States, 334 F. 2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964).
74. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
837 (1972); Jeffrey Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence
of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813 (2009).
75. Laird, 409 U.S. at 824-25; Jeffrey Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987).
76. Stempel, supra note 75, at 594 ("The reformist tide was given additional
force by Justice Rehnquist's participation in Tatum.").
77. S. REP. No. 93-419 at 5 (1973) ("This language also has the effect of
removing the so called 'duty to sit.' Such a concept has been criticized by legal
writers, and witnesses at the hearings were unanimously of the opinion that
elimination of this 'duty to sit' would enhance public confidence in the impartiality
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2007, the ABA retained the appearance of partiality standard in its
disqualification rule.78 That standard, which has been adopted in at
least forty-eight states, 79 is more than just another entry in the ever-
growing laundry list of disqualifying circumstances. It is an
organizing principle that subsumes all other grounds for
disqualification, by characterizing the specific, disqualifying
conflicts of interest that had accumulated over the course of the
preceding two centuries as comprising an incomplete list of
circumstances in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.80
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE APPEARANCES-BASED
DISQUALIFICATION REGIME
As noted at the outset of this article, judicial disqualification
is hot -heat attributable to concern over the state of judicial
disqualification in an appearances-based regime. To evaluate the
performance of that regime, it is useful to begin by identifying
regime goals. First, a disqualification regime that concerns itself
with how judicial conduct is reasonably perceived seeks to promote
public confidence in the courts.82 By ending the duty to sit and
of the judicial system."). Judicial Disqualification: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064,
93d Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) ("Finally, the bill relaxes the
so-called duty to sit in cases where the judge is not disqualified by the provisions
of the statute, and give him fair latitude to disqualify himself in other instances
where 'in his opinion, it would be improper for him to sit."').
78. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007).
79. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 13.
80. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a) (2007). The federal
corollary differs slightly, by characterizing enumerated conflicts of interest as
additional grounds for disqualification, rather than as illustrative circumstances of
when impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
81. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
82. Judicial Disqualfication: Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice of the Comm. on the Judiciary on
S. 1064, 93d Cong. 8 (1974) (statement of J. Traynor) ("It is not enough that
people have confidence in the sturdiness of judicial procedures. They must have
utmost confidence in the integrity of their judges."); Judicial Disqualification
Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 14 (1971) (statement of Sen.
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giving judges the authority to withdraw from cases in which their
participation would create perception problems, the public's
confidence in the courts, it was claimed, would be enhanced.83
Second, because it employs an objective standard that evaluates bias
problems from the perspective of a reasonable outside observer, an
appearances regime seeks to make disqualification more workable
and less capricious by obviating the need to rely on subjective
assessments of a judge's state of mind.84 Third, a disqualification
regime that enables judges to withdraw for perceived partiality
without having to concede actual bias seeks to make disqualification
Bayh) ("If we are concerned, as most of us are with the need to shore up public
confidence in our public institutions, we need to remove any scintilla of doubt that
the public might have that that judge would be prejudiced in his decision. And that
is why the criteria that we establish in S. 1886 is rather strict"). Note, Judicial
Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Need for Reform, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 763, 773
(1975); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARv. L. REv. 736, 746 (1973) ("[M]aintaining public confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process, compels adoption of the appearance test.").
83. Sen. Hearing on S. 1064, supra note 77, at 2 ("[T]he real evil of our
present law [is that] our system does not permit us to indulge the judge who would
'rather not' sit in a particular case. Our system says 'if you are not disqualified
you must sit."'); John Frank, Commentary on Disqualification of Judges-Canon
3C, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 377, 378 (describing a case in which a judge felt obligated
to sit despite appearance problems and observing that the new rule would avoid
such problems).
84. RICHARD FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 105 (2d ed. 2007) ("The objective standard was
implemented in an effort to make judicial disqualification determinations less
dependant on judicial caprice."); GEYH, supra note 48, at 17-18 (forthcoming
2011) ("[One justification for] making perceived partiality a grounds for
disqualification [is that] disqualifying judges for outward manifestations of what
could reasonably be construed as bias obviates the need to make subjective
judgment calls about what is actually going on inside a judge's heart and mind.");
Ellen M. Martin, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28
US.C. Section 144 and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 139, 147
(1976) ("The other major revision of section 455 was intended to broaden the
grounds for disqualification by replacing the old subjective standard for
disqualification for relationship with the objective standard established in the new
ABA Code. Rather than leave the decision regarding disqualification to the judge's
own opinion, new section 455(a) required that a judge recuse himself 'in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'); Note,
Judicial Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Needfor Reform, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 763,
773 (1975) ("The appearance test . . . by eliminating subjective speculation
concerning the source and nature of a judge's mental state, makes the application
of the standard easier.").
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less stigmatizing and hence more acceptable to judges for whom
impartiality is core to their self-definition.85 A logical corollary to
this third goal is that an appearances regime makes seeking
disqualification less problematic for lawyers who do not wish to
stigmatize or otherwise impugn the impartiality of judges before
whom they appear.86
The first goal of an appearances-based regime-promoting
public confidence in the courts-was foremost in the minds of those
who framed the 1972 Model Code and the 1974 amendments to §
455.8 The capacity of the regime to promote public confidence in
the courts turns first on the assumption that the legal establishment is
committed to preserving the appearance of judicial impartiality in
principle-committed enough to implement an appearance-based
disqualification rule in ways that serve its purpose. On that score, it
is clear that the bench and bar remain firmly committed to the
appearance of justice generally and the appearance of impartiality in
particular. Calling upon judges to disqualify themselves when their
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned" is a more recent
byproduct of the legal establishment's century-long campaign to
promote public confidence in the courts-a campaign that has
85. Sen. Hearing on S. 1064, supra note 77 at 18 (Statement of Sen. Bayh)
("One should not have to prove bias, because if you have to file an affidavit
affirmatively alleging prejudice and bias before a judge, it is going to do one of
two things, or maybe both: (1) It is going to prejudice that judge against that
counsel who has to try cases before him every day, every week, every year; or (2)
it is going to make that counsel reluctant to file a challenge alleging bias or
prejudice even though he knows it exists, because he is going to be concerned
about the prejudice this might establish in the judge's mind against him in future
cases."); John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 237, 243 (1987) (asserting that the appearance-based
disqualification standard "saves face for the judiciary, because a judge may be
removed while appellate courts continue to proclaim their confidence in her
impartiality").
86. Sen. Hearing on S. 1064, supra note 77, at 14 (Statement of Sen. Bayh)
("I think it is important for us not to put any of the attorneys practicing before the
bench in the position where they have to say to the judge, 'All right, we will go
along, Your honor, although we are concerned.' There is a great reluctance on the
part of counsel to suggest to the judge that he is prejudiced, because they are going
to have to go ahead and practice before that judge later.").
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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focused in large part on how judges are perceived by the public they
serve.
Since the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly manifested its concern for the risk of judicial bias, the
appearance of judicial bias, and temptations that could foster judicial
bias, separate and distinct from judicial bias itself.89 In addition,
state and federal ethics codes almost universally admonish judges to
avoid the "appearance of impropriety." 90 The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, upon which state and federal codes are fashioned,
defines "impropriety" to include "conduct that undermines a judge's
... impartiality."91 In a comment accompanying the rule directing
judges to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Model Code
explains that "[c]onduct that compromises or appears to compromise
the . . . impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the
judiciary," and that "the test for appearance of impropriety is
whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception"
that the judge (among other possibilities) engaged in "conduct that
reflects adversely on the judge's . . . impartiality." 9 2 In short, the
legal establishment's commitment to preserving the "appearance" of
propriety and impartiality in principle is sound.
The legal establishment's commitment to the appearance of
impartiality in principle, however, does not translate into a consensus
on when appearance problems worthy of disqualification arise. For
an appearances-based disqualification regime to enhance public
confidence in the courts, it is not enough for the legal establishment
to recognize that appearances matter, and that judges should
disqualify themselves when reasonable people might doubt their
impartiality. The legal establishment and the public must also share
a basic understanding of when it is reasonable to doubt the
88. Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an
Age ofIndividual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH-PRESS: THE COLLISION
OF THE COURTS, POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 22 (Keith Bybee, ed., Stanford
University Press 2007); see also Peter Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety:
Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 616 (1992)
(describing and critiquing the legal establishment's longstanding commitment to
avoiding the appearance of impropriety).
89. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, In Defense ofAppearances: What Caperton
v. Massey Should have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529, 543-49 (2010).
90. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
91. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
92. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2, cmt. 5 (2007).
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impartiality of a judge. Absent this common understanding among
judges, disqualification standards will fracture and fail; absent such
an understanding between judges and the public, disqualification
scenarios that cause the public to doubt the impartiality of its judges
will not coincide with disqualification scenarios that judges deem
worthy of concern; and absent a common understanding among
members of the public, decisions rendered in an appearances-based
disqualification regime will simply affront some as they reassure
others.
Achieving the appearances-based regime's second goal of
making disqualification more workable by relying on an objective
standard to determine whether a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, likewise assumes that there is a shared
view of when to doubt a judge's impartiality that can be embodied in
the "reasonable person" of song and story. Absent common ground,
the "reasonable" view is no easier to ascertain or apply than crawling
inside the skull of a particular judge to ascertain her actual motives.
For the reasons elaborated upon below, however, this all-important
consensus is lacking within the bench and bar, between the bench
and bar and the public, and within the public itself.
A. Fractures Within the Bench and Bar
The bench and bar agree that they should strive to avoid
appearance problems. It is harder, however, to agree on how to
operationalize the appearance of impropriety or partiality as an
enforceable legal standard. In 1969, the ABA promulgated the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9, which
admonished lawyers to "avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety." 93 Fourteen years later, the ABA dropped the provision
from its Model Rules of Professional Conduct; draft commentary
explained that "such a standard is too vague and could cause
judgments about the propriety of conduct to be made on instinctive,
ad hoc, or ad hominem criteria." 94
A similar debate occurred in 2007, in the context of
deliberation over the "appearance of impropriety" rule in the ABA's
proposed Model Code of Judicial Conduct. After three years of
review, the ABA's Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of
93. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969).
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 53 (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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Judicial Conduct proposed to downgrade avoiding the appearance of
impropriety from an enforceable standard (as it had been widely
construed to be in the 1990 Model Code) to an aspirational goal.9 5 It
did so, out of "continuing concern over the vagueness of the
'appearance of impropriety' as an enforceable standard," despite
objections that the proposal would dilute the Code's (and by
implication, the legal establishment's) commitment to avoiding
appearance problems. 96 A scathing editorial in the New York Times
followed, and when the new Model Code was being debated on the
floor of the ABA House of Delegates, the Commission acquiesced to
an amendment restoring the "appearance of impropriety" as an
enforceable rule, at the urging of the Conference of Chief Justices
and a number of legal organizations. 97
The ABA debate over the appearance of impropriety in the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct did not extend to the role that
appearances plays in disqualification, but the implications of that
debate for an appearances-based disqualification regime are
nonetheless present.98 A judge's impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned" for purposes of disqualification when he creates an
appearance of partiality. The appearance of partiality, in turn, is a
subset of the "appearance of impropriety," which the Commission
that reviewed the Model Code concluded was too indefinite to
enforce. One could argue that an appearance of partiality is more
95. CHARLES E. [sIc] GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS' NOTES TO
THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 17-18 (2007).
96. Id.
97. Editorial, The A.B.A. 's Judicial Ethics Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/opinion/09fri3.html (charging
the ABA commission with "following internal politics, not sound legal principle");
GEYH & WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 17-18.
98. As an active participant in the Code reform project, I am nonetheless left
to speculate why opponents of the appearance of impropriety in Rule 1.3 did not
likewise oppose the appearance of partiality embedded in the disqualification rule
(Rule 2.11(a)). The answer, I suspect, lies in the fact that the appearance of
impropriety rule is often enforced in disciplinary proceedings, and opposition to
that rule was led by the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, whose
members represent judges in such proceedings. The disqualification rule, in
contrast, is employed first and foremost as a procedural rule for judges to recuse
themselves sua sponte, or for litigants to seek a judge's disqualification, and is
used as a basis for discipline only rarely, when a judge's erroneous failure to
disqualify is willful. JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN &
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 4.01 (4th ed. 2007).
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"definite" than an appearance of impropriety because the former is a
narrower subset of the latter. This assumes, however, that concern
over the "appearance of impropriety" standard relates primarily to
the vagueness of the term "impropriety," rather than "appearance,"
which may not be the case. In short, the legal establishment is united
in the view that judges should avoid appearance problems but is less
certain about whether it has a common understanding of when
appearance problems arise that is sufficient to serve as the basis for
enforcing a rule.
Decisions concerning the appearance of impropriety
generally, and when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned for purposes of disqualification in particular, are not
unguided; rather, they are informed by precedent. As an author who
has taken money from publishers to write or co-write treatises on
judicial ethics and disqualification, I cannot be heard to say that the
precedent those treatises organize and digest is unhelpful to judges
who seek guidance on when to disqualify themselves under an
appearance-based disqualification regime. The question, however, is
whether that precedent is helpful enough to create a shared
understanding within the legal establishment of when a judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Such an understanding
is needed for an appearances-based disqualification regime to
achieve its goals.
One preliminary complication, which has been bemoaned by
others, is that disqualification precedent and analysis are deficient for
reasons having to do with the process by which they are generated. 99
First, the judge who disqualifies herself at the prompting of a party
or on her own initiative typically does so without explanation;
likewise, the judge who denies a motion to disqualify may or may
not see fit to explain her decision. 00  Second, disqualification
disputes are between the movant and the judge, rather than between
the parties, as a consequence of which disqualification motions are
often spared the rigors of the normal adversarial process.101 Third,
appellate review of disqualification decisions is confined almost
exclusively to allegedly erroneous non-disqualification; review of
99. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach
to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 531, 551-53 (2005); Steven Lubet, It
Takes a Court, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 226 (2010).




allegedly erroneous disqualification, while not unheard of, is
extremely rare. 102 Fourth, with rare exception, non-disqualification
is subject to a highly deferential standard of review on appeal (for
abuse of discretion or clear error).103 The net effect is that appellate
precedent is of limited utility to judges seeking guidance: appellate
courts do not decide when a judge is wrong to disqualify herself;
they do not decide when a judge is wrong not to disqualify herself,
except when she is so wrong that she abused her discretion; and
when they affirm a trial judge's decision not to disqualify herself, it
may be because they thought that the trial judge was right, or it may
be because they thought that the trial judge was not wrong enough to
override her discretion.
These concerns, while legitimate, should not be exaggerated:
appellate courts can and do manage to offer trial judges meaningful
guidance on their obligations under disqualification rules, in the
context of appellate opinions. As a consequence, precedent has
settled questions about whether a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned in a variety of specific contexts. 104My
primary concern, however, is not with the disqualification questions
that precedent has settled but with the unsettled questions that have
pushed disqualification into the spotlight. The structure of the
appearances-based disqualification rule proceeds from the unstated
premise that impartial judges are the norm, or default position. It is
reasonable to deviate from that default position and doubt the
impartiality of a judge under the rule only when one can point to
specific facts, events, or conduct upon which such doubt is
reasonably founded. Put another way, the traditional view that
animates the appearances regime begins with a presumption of
impartiality, in which "reasonable" people would agree that the
prototypical judge is committed to disregarding extralegal influences
and following the law. The question then becomes whether there is
evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption and lead a
reasonable person to doubt a particular judge's impartiality.
The history of judicial disqualification under the common
law began with an almost irrebuttable presumption of impartiality
followed by centuries of struggle to weaken that presumption in
different ways: by requiring disqualification for conflicts of interest
102. GEYH, supra note 48, at 22-30 (forthcoming 2011).
103. FLAMM, supra note 84, § 33.1.
104. Id.
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that pose a risk of bias; by crafting procedural mechanisms aimed at
forcing disqualification without a finding of actual bias; and by
forcing disqualification for reasonably perceived, rather than actual
bias.105 An ironclad presumption of impartiality is consistent with
the traditional and formalist view that judges bracket out extralegal
influences and follow the law. The ensuing agitation for more
stringent disqualification rules reflects a sentiment more closely tied
to the realist tradition-that judges are people too, and as such are
subject to extralegal influences; 10 6 hence, they should disqualify
themselves when those influences risk getting the better of them.
In order for the judiciary to articulate a coherent view of
when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, there
must be a rough consensus as to how sturdy the presumption of
impartiality should be. Such a consensus, however, is lacking:
judges of a more traditionalist bent will guard the presumption of
impartiality far more zealously than those with, for want of a better
term, more "realist" leanings.
In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether a plaintiffs due process rights
were violated by a state supreme court justice who refused to recuse
himself after receiving over $3 million in independent support for his
election from the defendant's CEO, while the case was pending.107
Commentary on Caperton has tended to dwell on the "probability of
bias" test that led the five-member majority to rule that Caperton's
rights were violated, the Pandora's box of uncertainties that the four
dissenters claimed the majority's new test had opened, and
Caperton's implications for judicial campaigns. os Lurking beneath
105. See supra Part II.
106. RoY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING FROM
LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 37-59 (2d ed. 2005).
107. Caperton v. Massey v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257
(2009).
108. See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, If You Speak Up You Must Stand Down:
Caperton and Its Limits, 45 W. VA. L. REV. 1287, 1333-36 (2010) (relating the
Caperton standard to judicial campaign support); Norman L. Greene, How Great Is
America's Tolerance For Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court's
Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule ofLaw in the United States, 112 W. VA. L.
REV. 873, 891-910 (2010) (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions and
Caperton's relation to judicial elections); Leon D. Lazer, The Probability ofActual
Bias, Objective Standards, and Pandora's Box-Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Company, 26 TOURO L. REV. 665 (2010) (discussing the "probability of bias"
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these issues, however, was a more fundamental rift over how deep
the presumption of impartiality ought to go. The dissenters
subscribed to the traditional view: "There is a 'presumption of
honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators' . . . . All
judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law
impartially, and we trust that they will live up to this promise." 09
The majority, in contrast, exhibited realist or scientific inclinations.
Its opinion emphasized the frailties of the human mind and the risk
of unconscious bias, which led it to question the capacity of judges
to make subjective assessments of their own impartiality. Without
an "objective" rule, the majority opined, "there may be no adequate
protection against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends
the real motives at work in deciding the case." 10 The objective rule
that the majority articulated, asked "whether, 'under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses,' the
interest [of the judge in question] 'poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented.'""1
Caperton may have established a new test for determining
when non-disqualification gives rise to due process problems, but it
did nothing to remediate the underlying divide over how strong the
presumption of impartiality should be. Even assuming that in future
cases the four dissenters relent and acquiesce to the "risk of actual
bias" test, it is safe to anticipate that that their assessment of that risk
will be colored by their underlying view that judges can be trusted to
abide by their oaths to remain impartial. In other words, except in
extreme or clearly settled cases, disqualification for bias, probable
bias, or perceived bias will remain a deeply fractured process as long
as judges lack a basic, shared understanding of when the
presumption of impartiality should yield.
This intra-judicial fracture has given rise to competing and
conflicting narratives describing the current disqualification
standard in the majority opinion and the criticisms of the standard in the dissents);
Stanley A. Leasure, Cash Justice and The Rule of Law: Post-Caperton Financing
of Judicial Elections 46 IDAHo L. REV. 619 (2010) (discussing Caperton, its
jurisprudential foundation, and the issues related to judicial elections); Penny J.
White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 HARv. L. REV. 120 (2009) (discussing
the majority and dissenting opinions and offering criticisms of the dissent).
109. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
110. Id. at 2263.
111. Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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landscape. One narrative is that judges take umbrage at
disqualification motions, which they regard as a slight to their
honesty and integrity. Lawyers are loath to seek disqualification
except in truly extreme cases because it will anger the judge without
leading to his disqualification."12 A second narrative is that lawyers
seek disqualification strategically, not because they doubt the judge's
real or perceived impartiality, but because they suspect that the judge
will be unsympathetic to their clients on the merits.'13 A third
narrative is that an appearances-based disqualification regime leads
to unnecessary disqualification by judges who are overly sensitive to
appearance concerns or are looking for excuses to avoid
uncomfortable situations." 4
While seemingly at odds, these conflicting narratives make
sense in a system where disqualification norms are fractured.
Traditionalist judges will take offense at the suggestion that they are
less than impartial-an appearances-based regime may seek to lessen
the stigma of disqualification by sparing judges the need to
acknowledge actual partiality, but when judges are accused of
112. See Frost, supra note 99, at 567-68 ("[F]or example, a district court
judge stated that he found the motion for his disqualification 'offensive' and he
asserted that it 'impugned [his] integrity"' (quoting Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350,
353 (7th Cir. 1996))); see also, Nancy M. Olson, Judicial Elections and
Courtroom Payola: A Look at the Ethical Rules Governing Lawyers' Campaign
Contributions and the Common Practice of "Anything Goes, " 8 CARDOzO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 341, 365 (2010) (arguing that recusal is an "illusory tool"
because "litigants fear bringing valid recusal motions because they may anger
judges, and because the odds of success are extremely low"); David K. Stott,
Comment, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality
Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 500-01 (2009) (arguing that the
"structural emphasis on judicial self-recusal creates a major weakness in existing
recusal standards-litigants fear judicial retribution").
113. See Norman L. Greene, How Great is America's Tolerance for Judicial
Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizen's
United, Their Implication for Judicial Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of
Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 906 (2010) ("[T]here are also
concerns about strategic recusals, where one judge or group of judges is inclined to
disqualify another principally because of a voter disagreement, as opposed to a
recusal standard necessarily being met."); Shugerman, supra note 88, at 536-37
(2010).
114. See generally Cravens, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that one of many
ways in which the current approach goes awry is in its promotion of over-recusal);
Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton: Changing the Role of Appearances in
Judicial Recusal Analysis, 42 McGEORGE L. REv. 65 (2010) (arguing that states
ought to tailor new recusal procedures in response to Caperton).
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apparent bias, it is easy enough to understand why they would
receive it as an unwelcome accusation of bias with a candy-coating.
Lawyers who risk angering traditionalist judges by seeking their
disqualification will thus think twice about doing so, unless they
have concluded that the judge will be averse to their position on the
merits, in which case they have less to lose by seeking
disqualification. Judges with realist tendencies, in contrast, may be
utterly unfazed by motions to disqualify and, in some cases, may
bend over backwards to preserve the appearance of impartiality by
stepping aside when asked, even when claims of perceived bias are
strained. In short, an intra-judicial schism over the strength of the
presumption of impartiality compromises the correctness of an
assumption key to the success of an appearances-based regime: that
judges share a common understanding of when impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
B. Fracture Between the Bench and Bar, and the Public
The schism over the presumption of impartiality is not only
intra-judicial, but between the bench and bar, on the one hand, and
the people they serve on the other, including the people's elected
representatives in legislatures. The fracture lines between the legal
establishment and the public are best understood in historical, legal,
and psychological terms.
1. The Historical Divide
The history of judicial disqualification recounted in Part II is
a history of legislators, who are doubtful of judges' impartiality,
enacting disqualification laws with which judges, convinced of their
own impartiality, grudgingly comply. Thus, cases arose in which
judges sat after concluding that the presumption of impartiality had
not been overcome by a specific conflict of interest rule. Unhappy
legislatures responded with new conflict of interest rules. Judges
interpreted the new rules to permit cases to fall through cracks
between them, and legislatures responded with more conflict rules
and procedures to disqualify judges for alleged bias. Ambivalent
judges gave the new procedures a parsimonious construction, and
legislatures responded with rules requiring disqualification for
Symposium 2011] 701
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
perceived bias.115  Judges loath to acknowledge perceived partiality,
in turn, have declined to disqualify themselves in a number of high-
profile cases which have provoked a public outcry, as described at
the outset of this article. The overall effect is what John Leubsdorf
has aptly described as a "vicious cycle," in which litigants move for
disqualification, judges resist, Congress responds with more
stringent disqualification rules, which are then subjected to judicial
interpretations that contort the rules again." 6
2. The Legal Divide
Fracture lines between the bench and bar on the one hand,
and the public on the other, are likewise visible in the law of judicial
conduct. For judges generally, commitment to impartiality is
entrenched and robust: Sir Matthew Hale's Code of Conduct
demanded it, Blackstone's commentaries presumed it, and canons of
judicial ethics promulgated in the early twentieth century called upon
judges to avoid even the appearance of "impropriety," which
subsumes the appearance of partiality. Current "law" governing
judicial conduct perpetuates this ethos of impartiality. The first
words of the first Canon of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
adopted with modifications in virtually every jurisdiction, declare:
"A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity and
115. This history likewise reflects a continued intra-judicial schism; the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which proposed the
first appearance-based disqualification rule, was propagated among the states by
supreme courts which adopted the Model Code. Taking Disqualification Seriously,
supra note 13, at 14 ("The Model Code's general provision, requiring
disqualification ifa judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned,' has been
adopted by every jurisdiction, with the possible exceptions of Montana and
Michigan."). Supreme courts adopting an appearance-based rule clearly approved
of the approach in principle and the discretion it afforded judges to disqualify
themselves when necessary. That supreme courts approved of the approach in
principle, however, does not mean that judges shared a common understanding of
when disqualifying appearance problems arose.
116. Leubsdorf, supra note 85, at 245 ("Litigants seeking to recuse
unfavorable judges file motions; judges step aside or resist, with the most biased
judges the least willing to withdraw; Congress and commentators survey the
questionable results, seeking to end them with more sweeping legislation; the new
legislation is thrown to the courts, where it undergoes the same pressures that
twisted its precursors."). See also Frost, supra note 99, at 534 ("[H]istory shows
that each time the standard for recusal is broadened by Congress, it is narrowed
soon thereafter as members of the judiciary apply it to themselves.").
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impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety."ll 7 Canon 2 states: "A Judge shall
perform the duties of judicial office impartially." 1 Rules
underlying Canon 2 elaborate-Rule 2.3, for example, directs that a
judge "shall perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or
prejudice."
Closely linked to the duty to remain impartial is the duty to
abide by the Rule of Law. Rule 2.2 states that a judge "shall uphold
and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly
and impartially," and an accompanying comment explains that
"[a]lthough each judge comes to the bench with a unique background
and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law
without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the
law in question." 20 Rule 2.4(B), in turn, states that a judge "shall
not permit family, social, political, financial or other relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment." 12 1
accompanying comment adds that "[a]n independent judiciary
requires that judges decide cases according to the law and facts,
without regard to whether the particular law or litigants are popular
or unpopular with the public, the media, government officials, or the
judge's friends or family," 22 and the Reporters' Notes explain that
this comment "link[s] the duty not to be swayed by the public,
friends, or family to the judge's primary obligation to follow the law
and facts impartially."1 23
In short, within the legal establishment, a "good" judge is an
ethical judge and an ethical judge is impartial, avoids the appearance
of partiality, and follows the law. When a party asks a judge to
disqualify himself because his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, it implies one of two possibilities: either the party is
alleging that the judge appears to be partial but has not stepped aside
on his own initiative, in contravention of his ethical duty to avoid the
appearance of impropriety;' 24 or the party is finessing an accusation
117. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
118. Id. at Canon 2.
119. Id. at R. 2.3(A).
120. Id. at R. 2.2 cmt. 1.
121. Id. at R. 2.4(B).
122. Id. at R. 2.4 cmt. 1.
123. GEYH & HODES, supra note 95, at 31.
124. In some cases, for example, when the disqualification motion is grounded
in extrajudicial statements of the judge creating an appearance of bias, it is the
703Symposium 2011]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
that the judge is biased in fact, in contravention of the judge's ethical
duty to be impartial.125  For judges who are truly committed to
administering justice impartially, neither possibility is one they will
concede lightly. Therein lies the problem for the third goal of the
appearances-based regime: judges will not find it appreciably less
stigmatizing to disqualify themselves for creating an appearance of
partiality if an appearance is itself problematic or if an allegation of
appearing partial is understood as a polite euphemism for partiality
in fact.
In the preceding section of this article, I pointed to a schism
within the bench and bar, in which some judges, including the
majority in Caperton, are willing to second-guess judicial
impartiality more readily than others. On the whole, however,
judges are naturally going to be slower than the public they serve to
second-guess the real or perceived impartiality of fellow judges.126
Disqualification can be conceptualized in two ways: as a matter of
litigation procedure and as a matter of judicial ethics.127 Those who
statements themselves that give rise to an appearance problem. See, e.g., United
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Roebuck, 271
F. Supp. 2d 712 (V.I. 2003). In other cases, for example, where the judge is a
close personal friend of a litigant, the underlying conduct-a personal
friendship--may be innocuous enough, but an appearance problem arises as a
result of the judge's failure to step aside on his own initiative after the case is filed.
No jurisdiction would discipline a judge for failing to disqualify himself before a
motion was filed, or for refusing to disqualify himself after a motion was filed, if
the refusal was in good faith. ALFINI, ET AL., supra note 98, § 4.01. The point,
however, remains that, except when the judge is unaware of the conduct giving
rise to the motion (e.g., the judge is unaware that a close relative recently acquired
a financial interest in a party appearing before the judge), the unstated premise of
the motion is that the judge is being asked to remedy an appearance problem that
he could (and implicitly should) have resolved by recusing himself sua sponte.
125. There is a more innocuous, third possibility that I discuss later: the judge
did not recognize the appearance problem until it was called to her attention. For
this possibility to gain traction with judges, however, the scientific or realist
approach to disqualification must be more widely accepted. See infra notes 213-
18 and accompanying text.
126. Courts have acknowledged this difference in world view by evaluating
whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned from the
perspective of a fully-informed, objective observer who is not a judge because
judges will be less skeptical of a fellow judge's impartiality than the general
public. GEYH, supra note 48, at 18. Such an approach, however, begs the question
of whether judges will credit the reasonableness of an objective outsider's
skepticism as readily as outsiders would.
127. GEYH, supra note 48, at 2.
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conceptualize disqualification requirements largely as rules of
practice and procedure that good lawyers exploit for the benefit of
their clients (contributing to the narrative that lawyers seek
disqualification for strategic reasons), may be unconcerned by the
implications of disqualification motions. If those judges have
internalized the lessons of legal realism and are sensitive to the
"psychological tendencies and human weaknesses" of the judicial
mind, they may be receptive, or at least not hostile, to
disqualification requests. 128 On the other hand, to the extent that
judges as a whole remain mindful of the ethical dimension to
disqualification, they are likely to embrace a more muscular
presumption of impartiality and be inherently skeptical of calls for
their disqualification. Even the Caperton majority, which concluded
that the circumstances there overcame the presumption of
impartiality, nevertheless took pains to emphasize numerous times
how exceptional those circumstances were.
Juxtaposed against this deep and abiding commitment to
impartiality and the rule of law embedded in codes of judicial
conduct are the disqualification rules themselves. Disqualification
rules enumerate the circumstances in which judges cannot be trusted
to rule impartially and according to law, i.e., when the risk is too
great that a judge's personal prejudices or preferences will get the
best of her. Disqualification rules thus challenge the ethos of
impartiality pervading codes of conduct and the judge's self-
definition. Although disqualification rules commonly appear in
codes of conduct that supreme courts adopt, the engine driving their
development is housed in legislatures that have been far more
skeptical of judicial impartiality than have judiciaries.
As previously noted, there is a presumption of impartiality
implicit in a rule-making disqualification, an exception to the norm
in contrast to a hypothetical rule proceeding from the opposite
presumption-that judges were disqualified except in enumerated
circumstances. The strength of that implicit presumption, however,
is unstated in the rules themselves, and the vicious circle described
by Leubdsorf can best be explained as a struggle between the weaker
presumption of impartiality shared by legislators who make
disqualification rules, and the stronger presumption of impartiality
held by judges who interpret and apply those rules. Thus, the
128. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).
129. Id
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burgeoning number of disqualifying events that legislatures have
added to their lists over the years, has been offset by a comparably
impressive list of rules of judicial construction that judges have
crafted to curtail the reach of disqualification requirements.1 30 Such
rules of judicial construction include: creating a powerful
presumption of impartiality;131 strictly construing disqualification
procedures against movants;132 offsetting the duty to disqualify with
a duty to sit;133 delegating disqualification decisions to the judge
whose impartiality is challenged;' 34 limiting acceptable evidence of
judicial partiality to that emanating from extrajudicial sources;' 35
subjecting non-disqualification to deferential standards of review;136
subjecting non-disqualification of judges on courts of last resort to
no review at all; 1 and limiting the application of disciplinary
sanctions for non-disqualification to circumstances deemed willful
rule violations. 138
Illustrative of the resulting schism between judges and their
defenders, on the one hand, and legislators and the public they
represent, on the other, is the fractious debate over "judicial
activism" and the rule of law. Impartiality subsumes a lack of bias
and an open mind enabling judges to set their personal prejudices
aside and uphold the rule of law. 1 39  Judges and court defenders,
seeking to shield judges from attacks by court critics, have rallied
around the principle that judges who are insulated from threats and
intimidation will bracket out extralegal influences and follow the
130. See infra notes 131-38.
131. FLAMM, supra note 84, § 3.3.
132. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993).
133. FLAMM, supra note 84, § 20.8.
134. Id. § 17.6.
135. Id. § 19.8.
136. Id. § 33.1.
137. See Steven Lubet, Ducks Redux, 92 JUDICATURE 223, 259 (March/April
2008) (noting that Supreme Court Justices exercise unreviewable discretion when
their impartiality is questioned); Robert S. Greenberg, Scalia Defends His
Impartiality in Cheney Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2004, at B 1 (same).
138. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 98, § 4.01.
139. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology ("'Impartial,'
'impartiality,' and 'impartially' mean absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or
against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open
mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.").
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law.'4 0 In contrast, court critics in legislatures and elsewhere accuse
judges of disregarding the law and acting on their personal feelings
and ideological appetites.141  Survey data show that while public
confidence in the courts remains strong, most people do not believe
judges when they say that they always follow the law and think
judges often base decisions on their personal feelings.142
I do not mean to imply that judges are or should be subject to
disqualification for their ideological predilections, except in extreme
cases when their views are so strongly held that they have publicly
pre-committed themselves to reach a particular result before the case
is heard.143 My point is simply that judges and the public do not
share a common view of what influences judges and their decision-
making and to what extent. In the context of disqualification, it
means that the public will be quicker to question the impartiality of
judges than will judges themselves.1 44 That, in turn, compromises
the ability of an appearances-based disqualification regime to
promote public confidence in the courts because the judges who
implement that regime will be untroubled by episodes of non-
disqualification that may be of much greater concern to a more
skeptical public.
140. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE:
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 279-82 (2006).
141. See id. (noting post realist critics that argue that judicial independence
undermines the preferences of political majorities).
142. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Maxwell Poll on Civic
Engagement and Inequality: Law and Courts Questions from 2005 Poll, 1-4
(2005) available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/
data sources/Law%20and%2OCourts%20Questions%20from%202005%2OPoll.pd
f.
143. This is the line that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct draws. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a)(5).
144. Disqualification precedent arguably addresses this problem by directing
judges to evaluate a judge's impartiality from the perspective of the public, or at
least an objective, external observer. E.g., In re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 56 (1st
Cir. 2006); United States v. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1998). As discussed in the next section, however, there are significant
psychological impediments to judges accurately assessing how they are perceived
by others.
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3. The Psychological Divide
Finally, the schism between the bench/bar and the public can
be understood in psychological terms. A multistate study conducted
by the American Judicature Society found that judges are ambivalent
about disqualification. 14 5  Given the foregoing discussion, that
should come as no surprise: disqualification rules give litigants a
means to challenge judicial impartiality, which is at the core of the
judge's self-definition.
At a more elemental level, however, disqualification practice
proceeds on two implicit assumptions: that judges are able to assess
the extent of their own bias; and that judges are able to assess how
others reasonably perceive their conduct. Neither assumption is safe.
Studies reveal that people generally are poor at self-
assessment and tend to be overly optimistic judges of their own
abilities.146 Inflated preconceptions of their abilities, in turn, lead
subjects to over-estimate their competence in performing specific
tasks.147  Unsurprisingly, then, test subjects "report being less
susceptible than their peers to various cognitive and motivational
biases."' 48 They tend to exhibit a blind spot to their own biases, take
their perception of the world as objective reality, and attribute
contradictory perspectives to bias in others, rather than
themselves.14 9
Drawing conclusions about judges from such data is risky
because judges differ from the general population in their training,
experience, and commitment to objectivity and impartiality. One
study, however, has found that judges are susceptible to implicit
racial bias.o5 0 Another has shown their vulnerability to egocentric
145. JEFFREY SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 42 (1995).
146. David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health,
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. PUB. INT. 69, 71-73
(2004).
147. David Dunning et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own
Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 83, 86 (2003).
148. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 374 (2002).
149. Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human
Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37-38 (2006).
150. Jeffrey Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1222 (2009).
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bias-the propensity to overestimate one's own abilities.15 1
Therefore, one can reasonably suspect that when evaluating the
extent of their own bias, judges' professed commitment to
impartiality may render them especially vulnerable to overly-
optimistic self-assessments or as Professor Steven Lubet calls it:
"introspection deficit disorder."' 52
Disqualification for the appearance of bias can serve as a
gentle proxy for suspected bias in fact, but when applying the
appearance-based test, judges do not ask whether they are biased in
fact, but whether they might reasonably appear so to another. Data
shows, however, that people view themselves differently than others
view them: whereas actors tend to evaluate their conduct in
situational terms (I was late because my alarm clock did not go off),
observers tend to evaluate actors' conduct in dispositional terms (he
was late because he is not a punctual person). 3 Whereas actors
evaluate their own conduct through introspection based on internal
inputs, observers evaluate the conduct of actors through
extrospection based on external cues. 154  That leads actors to
overvalue their introspections and undervalue or ignore those of
others. 55
To the extent judges evaluate their own conduct differently
than observers do, a schism between judges and the public is
inevitable. The conduct, or external cues, leading observers to
suspect that the judge has a biased disposition, will be marginalized
by the judge who: does not think himself biased; attributes his
conduct to the exigencies of the situation; and discredits opposing
inferences as uninformed. Thus, judges will be less inclined to find
themselves biased than the public at large would and will likewise be
less inclined to credit public suspicions of bias than will the public.
151. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
811-16 (2001).
152. STEVEN LUBET, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING HONEST 6 (2008).
153. Edward Jones & Richard Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent
Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, NEW YORK: GENERAL LEARNING PRESS
79, 80 (1971).
154. Emily Pronin, How We See Ourselves and How We See Others, 320
SCIENCE 1177, 1177 (2008).
155. Emily Pronin & M. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 565, 566 (2006).
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The historical, legal, and psychological schism between
judges and the public has manifested itself in several recent episodes.
Justice Scalia clung tenaciously to his conclusion that sitting on a
case in which one of the parties was a personal friend with whom he
had recently been duck hunting could not reasonably call his
impartiality into question and categorically dismissed public
expression of views to the contrary as unreasonable and ill-
informed.156 A New York Times investigation of judicial campaign
contributions in Ohio revealed that judges rarely disqualified
themselves from cases in which contributors appeared before them,
while an overwhelming majority of the public in Ohio and elsewhere
believed that campaign contributions influence judicial decisions. 5 7
The majority rule in the state and federal courts continues to be that
the presumption of impartiality judges enjoy justifies them deciding
their own disqualification motions, while survey data shows that the
vast majority of the public thinks that disqualification requests
should be assigned to a different judge.'5 8 In short, the prospects for
an appearances-based disqualification regime to promote public
confidence in the courts are undercut by recurrent divergence of
public and judicial views over when a judge's impartiality appears
doubtful.
C. Fractures Within Public Attitudes
The capacity of an appearances-based disqualification regime
to achieve its goals depends on a more or less coherent conception of
when it is reasonable to question a judge's impartiality that judges
and the public share. If, however, the public itself is deeply divided
156. Memorandum of Scalia, J., Cheney v. United States, 541 U.S. 913, 927-
29 (2004).
157. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, § 1, available at 2006 WLNR 16983797; T.C.
Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, THE PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A.
158. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 13 (noting that most
states authorize the subject judge to rule on disqualification); see Press Release,
Justice at Stake, Poll: Huge Majority Wants Firewall Between Judges, Election
Backers, (Feb. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/
newsroom/press_releases.cfm?show-news&newslD=5677 (finding that 81% of




over whether and when to trust its judges to be impartial, the search
for that coherent, shared conception becomes elusive if not illusory.
A majority of the public thinks that judges are impartial.159
One recent study has found that fully one-third of the public is so
confident in the impartiality of its judges that it does not second-
guess their impartiality, even in extreme-seeming scenarios where
parties make sizable contributions to a judge's reelection
campaign.160
Not all Americans share that view. A significant minority
lacks confidence in the courts and questions their impartiality. Of
particular concern, there is a noticeable divide along racial lines. In
one survey, a majority of whites (62%) believe that judges are fair
and impartial, while a majority of African-Americans (55%) believe
that judges are not fair and impartial. 16 1 Consistent with these
results, a major study conducted by the National Center for State
Courts found that "African-Americans tend to have distinctly lower
159. See ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 17 (2003).
160. James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of
Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Legitimacy of the Courts Be Rescued by
Recusal?, at 21 (July 2, 2009) (on file with authors) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1428723##. The authors' core
finding that two-thirds of the public does think that a judge's impartiality is
compromised when he receives campaign contributions from parties is obscured
by two additional findings that fixate their attention: first, that the public is as
troubled by rejected offers of support to a judge's campaign as accepted ones; and
second, that disqualification did not fully rectify the perception problems that
campaign contributions created. Id. at 30, 32. The first point, while interesting,
simply reinforces the importance of existing rules that require judges to create
campaign committees to receive contributions in their stead, where offers of
support rejected by campaign committees will not come to the judge's attention.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 (A)(8). The second finding is based on
survey results showing that disqualification does not restore the public's
confidence in the impartiality of the disqualified judge. Id. at 32. Such an inquiry
is puzzling: If, for example, a judge recuses himself from a women's rights case
because he is a raging misogynist, the data point that few respondents think the act
of disqualification will cure him of his misogyny is neither surprising nor relevant
from a regulatory perspective. The relevant point, which needs no survey support,
is that by disqualifying himself, the case will be heard by a different judge, who is
unencumbered by the disqualified judge's bias.
161. See Editorial, Judicial diversity-an essential component of a fair justice
system, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y (Mar. 2010), http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs editorial-
template.asp?content-id=907 (citing survey conducted by Justice at Stake in
2001).
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evaluations than do Whites of the performance, trustworthiness, and
fairness of courts."'1 62 For example, in a juror survey, 63% of white
respondents thought court outcomes tended to be fair, while only
21% of African-American respondents thought so.163
The default position of an appearances-based disqualification
regime is that judges are impartial: Disqualification is triggered by
information that leads a reasonable person to question a judge's
impartiality. When, however, a significant and identifiable subset of
the general population does not accept that default position and
begins from the premise that judges are not impartial, it leads to one
of two conclusions. Either the views of the subset-in this case,
African-Americans-are categorically unreasonable, or reasonable
people do not necessarily share the presumption of impartiality upon
which an appearances-based regime is grounded. Implicitly, the
"law" has opted for the former conclusion, by clinging to the
presumption that most African-Americans do not share-an
understandable tack, given the impracticable alternative of
disqualifying judges categorically as partial-seeming. My ultimate
point, however, is that the efforts of an appearances-based
disqualification regime to promote public confidence in the courts is
doomed from the start, to the extent that a segment of the public that
ought to be of primary concern to the legal establishment (because
its confidence in courts is low) does not share the presumption of
impartiality that the regime employs as its starting point.
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE APPEARANCES-BASED
DISQUALIFICATION REGIME
I am not alone in my doubts about the future of an
appearances-based disqualification regime. Others have proposed
alternatives that, in effect, seek to resurrect and rehabilitate one of
the three predecessor regimes discussed in Part II.
162. DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS IN YOUR
COMMUNITy: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY, FINAL
REPORT 10 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/
201302.pdf.
163. Id. at 65.
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A. Revitalizing the Presumption ofImpartiality
Although the legal establishment as a whole remains
committed to the appearance of justice in principle, some have
dissented from the view that keeping up appearances is a worthy
goal.164 Doubts about the intrinsic merits of obsessing over
appearances, coupled with the inability of the appearances-based
regime to articulate a coherent and enforceable standard for
disqualification, has led Professor Sarah Cravens to argue that
"actual justice" should replace the appearance of justice as the
lodestar for disqualification.' 65 Such an approach effectively reverts
to a robust presumption of impartiality that focuses attention on the
reasons a judge offers for the decisions she makes and requires
disqualification only when those reasons reflect the judge's inability
or unwillingness to do actual justice in the case.
For Cravens, presumably, none of the problem cases
discussed at the outset of this article are problem cases because the
judges in question offer reasons for their decisions that manifest no
incapacity to reach a result that does actual justice. West Virginia
Justice Brent Benjamin adopted this approach himself when
declining to disqualify himself from Caperton, arguing that a
disqualification rule based on appearances was too vague and that
the focus ought to be on the "actuality" of justice as reflected in the
reasons justifying the decisions he made.' 66
Proposals for the return of a strong presumption of judicial
impartiality that can be overcome only when necessary to do actual
justice are provocative but wrongheaded, for two reasons. First,
these approaches fixate on the lesser concern of over-
disqualification, which is already subject to independent
regulation. 167 Second, and more fundamentally, approaches which
164. See Peter Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the
Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REv. 593, 595 (1992); see also Alex Kozinski, The
Appearance ofPropriety, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 19.
165. Cravens, supra note 21, at 5.
166. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 292-93 (W. Va.
2008) (Benjamin, J., concurring).
167. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.7 (2007), provides that "a
judge shall hear and decide all matters assigned to the judge, except when
disqualification is required," and an accompanying comment cautions that
"[u]nwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and to the
judge personally."
713Symposium 2011]
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
pay no heed to the real, probable, or perceived bias of the judge and
focus exclusively on the reasons a judge gives for her decisions,
reflect a problematic conception of "actual justice."
For proponents of an "actual justice" approach, the primary
problem with an appearances-based disqualification regime is that it
leads to over-disqualification by judges who are impartial and would
do actual justice but who disqualify themselves to avoid perception
problems-or cases they would rather not decide. The problem of
over-disqualification is largely one of squandering judicial resources
on the administration of unnecessary disqualifications, whereas the
problem of under-disqualification is one of subjecting litigants to the
loss of life, liberty, or property in an unfair (or seemingly unfair)
process. As between promoting fairness and administrative
efficiency, the former goal is intuitively more compelling.168 To the
extent that over-disqualification arguably damages public confidence
by creating unwarranted doubts about judicial impartiality, 16 9 it is
proscribed by a separate ethics rule that judges violate on pain of
discipline: "A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the
judge, except when disqualification is required."1 70  A comment
accompanying this rule in the Model Code explains that "the dignity
of the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and
a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the
judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to
avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular
issues."1 71  Over-disqualification is thus a lesser, independently
regulated concern that would hardly seem to warrant a regime
change.
More fundamentally, a disqualification standard that purports
to ensure "actual justice" by looking exclusively at the reasons
judges give for their rulings reflects an anachronistic understanding
of judicial decision-making and embraces an impoverished
conception of justice. One need not be an exponent of critical legal
168. Shugerman, supra note 89, at 552.
169. Chief Justice Roberts made a related argument in his dissent in Caperton:
"The Court's new 'rule' . . . will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that
judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be. The end result will
do far more to erode public confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated
failure to recuse in a particular case." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.
Ct. 2252, 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).




studies to recognize that able lawyers (and judges) can conjure
plausible reasons for varying outcomes in every case that is not so
frivolous as to warrant sanctions for the suit being filed or defended.
Were a judge to place those reasons on a wheel and explain her
decisions with reference to whichever one she stuck with a dart, no
theory of which I am aware would claim that justice was done
simply because the reason so chosen was plausible. The same would
be true if the judge's choice of reasons was dictated by bias instead
of a dart. Codes of conduct promote judicial independence,
integrity, and impartiality because "actual justice" demands more
than rationality-it demands that the decisions judges make be
unsullied by bias, dependence, or dishonesty, regardless of whether a
biased, dependent, or dishonest judge can rationalize his decisions
coherently. Yet, a disqualification regime that evaluates a judge's
fitness to sit with exclusive reference to whether the decisions he
renders are supported by acceptable reasons would, of necessity, bar
disqualification for suspected bias, actual bias, and even corruption,
as long as judges are clever enough to devise plausible explanations
for their decisions. In a post-realist age, when the best empirical
work to date shows that the decisions judges make cannot be
divorced from the judges who make them because judicial decision-
making is subject to a complex array of legal and extralegal
influences,172 confining proof of judicial partiality to an analysis of
the opinions judges generate seems strangely naive.
B. Reinvigorating a Conflicts Regime
A multi-state study of judicial disqualification conducted in
the 1990s found that while judges were ambivalent about
disqualification generally, they were less so about disqualification
for conflicts of interest.173  To the extent that problems with
disqualification arise in the absence of intra-judicial consensus on
when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, one
possible solution is to diminish reliance on that standard by
expanding the list of specifically enumerated conflict scenarios in
which disqualification is automatic. In other words, requiring judges
to withdraw in specified circumstances (when rule-makers deem the
172. WHAT'S LAw GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES Do AND WHY iT
MATTERS (Charles Gardner Geyh, ed., forthcoming 2011).
173. SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 145, at 67.
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risk of bias too high) reduces, if not eliminates the discretion that has
caused the appearances-based disqualification regime to fracture.
In the past few years, the American Bar Association, as
keeper of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, has sought to guard
against under-disqualification by crafting new conflicts rules to
address disqualification scenarios that would otherwise be regulated
by the general appearances-based standard. In 1999, the ABA
revised the Model Code to require disqualification for campaign
contributions in excess of a dollar threshold, in response to concerns
that judges were not disqualifying themselves from cases in which
parties or their lawyers had contributed substantially to the judge's
election campaign. 74 In 2003, the ABA revised its Model Code
again, to require disqualification when judges had previously
committed themselves to deciding the issue now before them in a
particular way.175  This was a response to the Supreme Court's
decision in White, which declared that judicial candidates had a right
to announce their views on issues that they were likely to decide as
judges.176 In 2010, the ABA's Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence proposed a post-Caperton rule that would require
disqualification when parties or lawyers then before the judge had
lent independent support to the judge's campaign, under
circumstances specified in the rule. 7 7
There is nothing wrong per se with a conflicts-based
approach to disqualification. Inevitably, however, specific,
conflicts-based disqualification "solutions" operate one step behind
the innumerable disqualification problems that arise and cannot
address those problems until they have recurred with frequency and
force sufficient to prompt a rule change. Moreover, disqualification
is often desirable under circumstances that are insusceptible to
capture in clearly worded rules. For example, it is generally
accepted that a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned
when especially close friends appear before the judge as litigants,
lawyers, or witnesses but not when mere acquaintances do.'7 1 In the
aftermath of imbroglios such as Justice Scalia's duck hunt with Vice
President Cheney while the latter's case was pending before the
174. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(e) (2005).
175. Id. at Canon 3E(1)(f).
176. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002).
177. Draft on file with the author.
178. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 98, § 4.09.
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Supreme Court, it is tempting to propose a conflicts-based rule to bar
judges from hearing cases in which personal friends appear before
them, and at least one scholar has made such a proposal.179 As a
practical matter, however, a rule that legislates the distinction
between friends and acquaintances can be no more helpful than the
general, appearances-based disqualification rule it replaces. If such a
rule simply declares that judges must disqualify themselves when
close friends appear before them, it does no more than codify
existing precedent under the general disqualification rule and avoids
the very question it needs to address. If the rule seeks to guide
judges on the distinction between friends and acquaintances, such
guidance must either draw arbitrary lines (by requiring
disqualification if a party is the judge's former roommate, maid of
honor, godparent to the judge's child, etc.) or revert to general
standards of reasonableness or perception that afford judges the
discretion that specific, conflicts-based rules seek to constrain.
Several existing conflicts rules illustrate this latter problem
by trading bright lines for flexibility in ways that promote reasonable
outcomes at the expense of predictability, thereby blurring the
distinction between a conflicts-based approach to disqualification
and an appearances regime. For example, under Model Code Rule
2.11 (A)(3), a judge must disqualify himself if he has an "economic
interest" in the subject matter of the case.s The Code defines
"economic interest" to mean more than a "de minimis" interest. "De
minimis," in turn, is defined to mean "an insignificant interest that
could not raise a reasonable question regarding the judge's
impartiality"-which circles the analysis back to an appearances-
based standard. 18 Similarly, Rule 2.11 (A)(5) calls on a judge to
disqualify herself for making a prior public statement that "appears
to commit the judge to reach a particular result" in the case.
Presumably, whether a judge "appears" to have committed herself
must be evaluated from the perspective of the same elusive,
objective, reasonable observer that has caused the appearances-based
disqualification regime to fracture.
179. Miller, supra note 18, at 577-78.
180. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A)(3) (2007).
181. The same issue arises with a separate rule that calls for disqualification
for other interests that are "more than de minimis," which, as just noted, is a term
defined with recourse to appearances. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(A)(2)(c) (2007).
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I do not mean to beat a straw man into horse bedding here.
Proponents of new, conflicts-oriented disqualification rules seek
discrete solutions to specific problems. They do not propose such
rules, alone or in combination, as a global cure for what ails the law
of disqualification, and there is no need for me to critique a regime
change that no one advocates. My point is simply that conflicts rules
are, by their nature, piecemeal reforms that may serve their limited
purposes well but which remain too limited in scope to remedy the
larger problems of an appearances-based disqualification regime.
C. Resurrecting a Procedural Regime
The first procedural regime was limited in scope; it sought to
facilitate judicial disqualification for bias by enabling litigants to
invoke procedures that required the jud e to withdraw without a
showing that the judge was biased in fact. 2 More recently, scholars
and good government organizations began supporting a wider range
of disqualification proposals that can be loosely organized under the
heading of procedural reform. Such proposals include: expanding
the use of peremptory challenge procedures for trial judges;1 83
assigning a different judge to decide disqualification motions;184
integrating disqualification practice into the adversarial process by
enabling both litigants (not just the movant) to participate in framing
the operative issues; requiring the judge to provide the parties with
reasoned explanations for disqualification rulings;18 6 subjecting non-
disqualification to de novo review on appeal;' 8 7 establishing a
process for review of non-disqualification by appellate judges; 1 88 and
devising a procedure to replace disqualified appellate judges.189
182. Supra Part II.B.
183. Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should
Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 526-27 (2007).
184. Id. at 530; Frost, supra note 99, at 583-84.
185. Frost, supra note 99, at 582.
186. Goldberg et al., supra note 183, at 531.
187. Id. at 531-32.
188. Frost, supra note 99, at 584.
189. Goldberg et al., supra note 183, at 532.
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1. The Case for Procedural Reform
The recent push for procedural reform manifests an ongoing
struggle for disqualification to join the mainstream of judicial
administration. Having a judge rule on the propriety of his own
conduct, without the benefit of adversarial argument, without the
need to explain his decision, and subject to a deferential standard of
review or no review at all, reflects the extent to which
disqualification has been marginalized. Taking disqualification more
seriously by subjecting it to the traditional rigors of the legal process
is thus a significant step in its evolution. Professor Amanda Frost
comes closest to articulating a unifying theme for these procedural
reforms when she advocates a "process-oriented approach to judicial
recusal"l 90:
It is time to stop tinkering with the substantive
standard for recusal, and instead to propose reforming
the process by which the recusal decision is made.
The solution I offer is to incorporate into recusal law
the core tenets of adjudication . . . essential to
maintaining the judiciary's legitimacy . . . . Chief
among these are the adversarial system in which
parties present facts and arguments to an impartial
judge, who then issues a reasoned explanation for her
ruling. 191
Put in broader context, at a time when the appearances-based
regime is crumbling because consensus on the application of
substantive disqualification rules is lacking, reorienting the focus
toward procedural reform is a natural next step. The goals of an
appearance based disqualification regime have been to promote
public confidence in the courts by linking the need for
disqualification to public perception and to end under-recusal by de-
stigmatizing disqualification and obviating the need for subjective
assessments of actual bias. While procedural reform seeks to
improve the quality of disqualification decision-making generally, it
does so in ways that further the goals that the appearances-based
regime has pursued but failed to achieve. For example, preemptory
190. Frost, supra note 99, at 531.
191. Id. at 535.
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challenge procedures address under-disqualification without recourse
to stigmatizing challenges to a judge's impartiality or inquiries into
the judge's state of mind. Reassigning disqualification motions to a
different judge promotes public confidence by dispelling suspicions
that the fox is guarding the henhouse.
Of particular importance, procedural reform can promote
public confidence in the disqualification process despite an ongoing
lack of consensus over the interpretation of substantive
disqualification standards that judges apply. Research on public
satisfaction with courts has yielded several important findings. In a
study of misdemeanor cases, Professor Tom Tyler found that among
defendants, case outcomes had "no direct effect on assessments of
the judge or of the court system beyond what could be explained by
perceptions of fairness," which led Tyler to conclude that defendants
who "fare poorly at trial will not denigrate the judge or the system so
long as they believe their outcomes are fair ones reached by fair
procedures."l 92 Later studies reached similar conclusions in felony
cases and civil actions. 193 A major study by the National Center for
State Courts Study concurred that "perceptions that courts use fair
procedures and treat groups equally are the strongest predictors of
favorable evaluations of court performance." 94  Taken together,
"studies have consistently found that judgments of the fairness of the
procedures that occur when citizens deal with legal authorities
influence citizen satisfaction and evaluation of those authorities."'l 95
Tyler's work further reveals that from the public's
perspective, "procedural justice" in court settings is a multifaceted
concept that brings at least seven considerations to bear: (1) the
judge's efforts to be fair, (2) the judge's honesty, (3) the ethics of the
judge's conduct, (4) the parties' opportunity for representation, (5)
the quality of the judge's decisions, (6) the opportunity for appeal,
and (7) the judge's bias.196 Each of these seven considerations is
implicated by one or more proposed reforms to disqualification
192. Tom R. Tyler, The Role ofPerceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluation
of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51, 69-70 (1984).
193. ToM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCiETY 82-83
(1997).
194. ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 162, at 60.
195. Tom Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 103, 117 (1988)
(citations omitted).
196. Id. at 121.
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procedure. Mechanisms providing a different judge to decide
disqualification motions and enabling parties to strike a judge they
distrust aim to reassure litigants that their judge will be fair, honest,
ethical (respectful of their right to an impartial decision-maker),1 97
and unbiased. Requiring judges to explain their disqualification
rulings aims to improve the quality of decision-making, as does
subjecting disqualification questions to the rigors of the adversarial
process, with the latter also increasing (at least indirectly) the
parties' opportunity for representation in the disqualification process.
Finally, proposals to end deferential review of disqualification
determinations by trial judges and establish a means to review non-
disqualification of Supreme Court justices effectively enhance the
opportunity for meaningful appellate review.
Given the complex, multifaceted character of procedural
fairness, studies have shown that the perceived fairness of procedure
is context-dependent.' 98 However, "there is considerable consensus
among Americans about what constitutes a fair procedure within a
particular setting." 199 It is thus unsurprising, for example, to find
widespread agreement that in disqualification proceedings, rulings
should not be made by the judge whose disqualification is sought. 20 0
In sum, research on procedural justice tells us that if courts follow
disqualification procedures that the public regards as fair, public
confidence is less likely to be adversely affected by disagreement
over the substantive outcomes of disqualification rulings that courts
make.
2. Procedural Reform and the Public Confidence
Puzzle
The primary argument against procedural reform is the claim
that it is unnecessary. Judges who are committed to and convinced
of their collective impartiality may regard the campaign for
197. In Tyler's study, "ethical" related to whether the judge treated litigants
with courtesy and respected their rights. Id. at 129.
198. TYLER ET AL., supra note 193, at 92.
199. Id.
200. See Pronin et al., supra note 148 (discussing the social psychology
study's conclusion that one who is susceptible to bias has difficulty avoiding that
bias, but when the bias is negative, one works hard to avoid that bias and denies
susceptibility to that bias. Thus, a biased judge cannot avoid his bias, even if he
seeks to avoid it and denies his susceptibility.).
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disqualification reform as much ado about nothing, or as Judge Edith
Jones told the press, "a solution in search of a problem."201 Such
categorical pronouncements are belied by the analysis in Part III,
which shows the extent to which an appearances-based
disqualification regime has failed to achieve its objectives.
Nevertheless, recent survey research suggests the possibility
that concern over non-disqualification and its impact on public
confidence in the courts is overblown. For example, Professor James
Gibson has reported that the public is untroubled by judicial
candidates who announce their views on issues they will decide as
judges or who promise to decide issues in specific ways;202
presumably, the public would likewise be untroubled if those judges
declined to disqualify themselves from subsequent cases in which
those issues arose. Similarly, Gibson and Professor Gregory
Caldeira have reported that while a majority is concerned when
judges accept campaign contributions from parties who appear
before them, they are equally concerned when the judge declines
contributions offered and in neither case does disqualification allay
their suspicions.203 Finally, despite the recurrence of non-
disqualification stories in the news, survey data show that public
confidence in the judiciary remains high and relatively stable.20
One can quarrel with these results on a question by question
basis (and I have).205 My overriding point for purposes here,
however, is a more general one, with a twofold thrust. First, survey
201. David Ingram, Congress Set to Take Aim at Judicial Recusals, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 2, 2009, at 1.
202. James L. Gibson, "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy
of State High Courts, 71 J. POL. 1285, 1294 (2009).
203. James Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of
Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by
Recusals? 22 (Feb. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
204. Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, 2006 Annenberg Judicial
Independence Survey, prepared for the Princeton Survey Research Associates
International, available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
Downloads/Releases/ReleaseCourts2006O928/CourtsRelease_20060928.pdf;
Beldon et al., Access to Justice and Constitutional Rights Versus Political
Pressure: Defining the Battle for the Courts, in JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
SPEAK TO AMERICAN VALUES: A HANDBOOK FOR WINNING THE DEBATE FOR FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL COURTS 13, 17 (2006).
205. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and
Why it Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1276-
77 n.94 (2008); see also supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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data should be relied upon with caution because so much depends on
how survey questions are framed. Second, the "public" that social
scientists and pollsters survey is not the "public" of primary concern
to the legal establishment, which creates confusion when public
confidence problems of concern to the bench and bar are not
reflected in survey data (and vice versa).
In debates over public confidence in the courts, survey data
are routinely impressed into the service of opposing arguments.
Judge Harold Leventhal's observation about the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation-that it is like "looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends" 206 -applies equally to the use of
surveys. To no small extent, the answers one gets turn on how the
questions are framed: To support an argument that the public favors
"judicial independence," one can rely on surveys in which
respondents are asked whether they favor efforts to threaten or
intimidate judges, and they do not.207 To oppose such an argument,
one can turn to surveys that ask whether the respondents favor
holding judges accountable for their decisions and stopping judges
who repeatedly ignore voter values, and they do.208 To support an
argument that the public embraces "legal realism," one can ask
whether respondents favor judges who seek to achieve fair or just
results, and they do. 209 To oppose that argument, ask them whether
206. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting a
conversation of the author with Harold Leventhal).
207. Beldon et al., supra note 204, at 13, 18 (indicating that 63% of
respondents disapproved of threatening a judge with impeachment for a single
decision); see also The Maxwell Poll, Law and Courts Questions from 2005 Poll
(2005), http://www.maxwell.syr.eduluploadedFiles/campbell/datasources/Law/o
20and%2OCourts%2OQuestions%20from%202005%2OPoll.pdf (indicating that
71.9% of respondents agree that "[j]udges should be shielded from outside
pressure and allowed to make their decisions based on their own independent
reading of the law").
208. John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to Promote the Courts and Blunt
Attacks on Judiciary, 41 CT. REv. 10, 11 (2004) (indicating that 70% of
respondents desire that the court not stray far from community norms); Martha
Neil, Half of U.S. Sees "Judicial Activism Crisis," ABA J. E-REPORT, Sept. 30,
2005 (indicating that 56% either somewhat or strongly agreed with the proposition
"that court opinions should be in line with voters' values," and judges going
against those values should be impeached).
209. Justice at Stake, 2001 National Bipartisan Survey (2001) [hereinafter
2001 National Bipartisan Survey], available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults-6F537F9927
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they favor judges who disregard the law and act upon their personal
or political preferences, and they do not.2o Public support for
"judicial activism" can be found in surveys that show respondents
favor judges who protect individual rights against political branch
encroachment; 2 11 on the flip side, the public opposes "activists" who
act upon their ideological predilections. 2 12
Notwithstanding such manipulations, understanding the
public's views is of enormous importance to a body of law that seeks
to promote public confidence in the courts. As with "judicial
independence," "legal realism," and "judicial activism," the views of
the "public" likewise depend on how the term "public" is framed.
Public opinion surveys prepared by social scientists and polling
organizations define the "public" literally to mean everyone-or at
least a representative subset of everyone with the acuity and
enthusiasm needed to operate a pencil or answer a telephone and
complete a survey.
Although the legal establishment sometimes cites general
public opinion surveys in its policy analyses, the public of primary
concern to judges and lawyers is narrower. First, as a philosophical
matter, the legal establishment is concerned about the institutional
legitimacy of government, which, in a democratic republic, depends
on the consent of the "public" being governed.213 This concern,
2D4.pdf (indicating that 63% of respondents rated "[e]nsuring fairness under law"
as at least 8 out of 10, with 10 being the most important duty of a judge).
210. Keith Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in
WHAT'S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES Do AND WHY IT MATTERS
(Charles Gardner Geyh, ed., forthcoming 2011) ("Polls show that large majorities
of Americans expect federal judges to apply the law impartially and distrust judges
who advance narrow ideological interests.").
211. James Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging: Are Politicians in Robes
Inevitably Illegitimate?, in WHAT'S LAw GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES Do
AND WHY IT MATTERS (Charles Gardner Geyh, ed., forthcoming 2011) (indicating
that 51.8% of respondents rated "Defending constitutional rights and freedoms" as
10 out of 10 with 10 signifying the most important function of a judge); see also
2001 National Bipartisan Survey, supra note 209, at 6 (indicating that 93% of
respondents found the proposition "[o]ur courts' most important job is to protect
our civil and constitutional rights" either very or somewhat convincing).
212. Neil, supra note 208, at 1 (indicating that 56% agreed with the statement
that there is a judicial activism crisis).
213. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 159, at 10 ("[P]ublic
confidence in our judicial system is an end in itself. A government of the people,
by the people, and for the people rises or falls with the will or consent of the
governed.").
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however, does not necessarily implicate the "public" in the universal
sense of the term: The consent of the governed is unaffected by the
views of the passive, indifferent, and disengaged-that segment of
the public which may report its ennui over governmental institutions
in telephone surveys but is insufficiently concerned to act upon it by
rebelling or otherwise actively withholding its "consent" to be
governed.214  Hence, few within the legal establishment would
seriously suggest that Congress loses its legitimacy to govern when
its approval ratings dip below 50% in public opinion surveys.
Second, as an instrumental matter, without "public"
confidence in the judiciary, proposals to control the courts in ways
that the legal establishment finds wrongheaded and threatening will
215
gain traction. From this perspective, the "public" that matters to
the legal establishment is the public that is engaged enough to act
upon its dissatisfaction by, for example, electing representatives who
are committed to curbing the courts-which can be a minority of the
public as a whole.
Third, as a customer relations matter, the "public" that
matters to the legal establishment is the public that the judiciary
serves as litigants, witnesses, and jurors.21 From this perspective,
the views of those who have no direct contact with the courts are of
secondary concern relative to consumers of judicial services, who
courts affect directly. For the legal establishment, this may be the
"public" that matters most. It is the segment over whom the legal
establishment has direct influence, and it is disaffected litigants and
their families, friends, lawyers, and elected representatives who are
most likely to be members of the other "public" of concern-those
who agitate for court reform and who may ultimately challenge the
legitimacy of the judiciary itself.
214. Of course, events may lead the passively disaffected to become actively
disaffected, and thereby morph them into members of a "public" that does matter
to the legal establishment.
215. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 159, at 13-14 ("If the public
loses faith in a judiciary it perceives to have run amok, the obvious solution will be
to bring the judiciary under greater popular control to the ultimate detriment of
judicial independence and the rule of law that judicial independence makes
possible . . . .").
216. Id. at 65-66 ("Public perceptions of the courts . . . . can be profoundly
shaped by direct contact with the judicial system as jurors, witnesses, or litigants,
or indirectly when a friend or family member serves in those capacities. These
points of contact should be capitalized upon.").
Symposium 2011] 725
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
To illustrate this divide between general public opinion and
the narrower public opinion of concern to the bench and bar, many
judges, lawyers, and law professors have argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White-which
held that judicial candidates have a first amendment right to
announce their views on issues that they may decide as judges 217-
threatens to undermine public confidence in judicial impartiality. 2 18
That concern fueled an amendment to the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which required judges to disqualify themselves from cases
in which they had previously committed or appeared to commit
themselves to reach a particular result on an issue now before
them.2 19 As previously noted, however, Gibson found that the public
welcomed information about where judicial candidates stood on
various issues and was unfazed by judges who made campaign
promises to resolve issues in specified ways. Such findings,
however, do little to dispel concerns within the legal establishment.
From the perspective of judges and lawyers, the public confidence
problem must be assessed from the perspective of parties whose
confidence in the impartiality of the courts may be undermined by
appearing before judges who have (or appear to have) committed
themselves to rule in particular ways before a party's case is even
called.
A comprehensive study of public confidence in the courts
conducted by the National Center for State Courts found that
confidence levels were consistently lower among respondents who
had first hand exposure to the justice system.220 That may explain
why the legal establishment is chronically more concerned about the
state of public confidence in the courts than would seem to be
217. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
218. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 265, 268 (2008); Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How
States are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How
Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 642 (2005).
219. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(5) (2007) (stating that a
judge shall disqualify himself or herself if "[t]he judge, while a judge or a judicial
candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial
decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to read a
particular result or rule in a particular way" in a proceeding or controversy before
them).
220. RoTrMAN ET AL., supra note 162, at 60 ("People with recent court
experience tend to hold less positive views of the courts than do those without that
experience."). This finding is corroborated by other studies. Id. at 15-16.
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warranted by rosy-seeming results in general public opinion surveys.
Given the legal establishment's customer relations concern coupled
with the results of Tyler's research discussed earlier,221 a revamped
procedural regime, which seeks to make the disqualification process
more transparent and fair-seeming for litigants, has obvious appeal.
3. The Future of Procedural Reform
Procedural overhaul may represent the next wave in the
history of disqualification reform, but its likely impact remains
unclear. Some scholars attribute the chronic inability of rigorous
disqualification standards to gain traction to judicial self-dealing by
biased judges, who contort the rules to thwart their objectives.22  In
my view, the problem is better explained as a paradox:
Disqualification standards that are designed to second guess the
impartiality of judges are interpreted and applied by judges who are
so committed to their own impartiality that they are loath to second
guess themselves. The real "enemies" of reform, then, are not bad
judges intent on subverting disqualification requirements but good
judges whose commitment to their own impartiality interferes with
the achievement of disqualification objectives.
The first procedural regime fell victim to the disqualification
paradox, as judges, troubled by procedures enabling litigants to
secure disqualification with unsupported allegations of bias,
interpreted statutory requirements so strictly as to defeat the
legislation's purpose. A similar future may await a new procedural
regime. In 2009, the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence circulated a draft resolution
proposing that states consider (not adopt, but merely "consider") a
package of reforms to disqualification procedure, including several
of the proposals listed above. 223 The draft resolution, and the
221. Tyler, supra notes 192, 193, 195-99 and accompanying text.
222. Leubsdorf, supra note 85, at 245 (attributing the cyclical inability of
disqualification rules to be fully implemented to "the most biased judges," who are
"the least willing to withdraw"); Frost, supra note 99, at 534 (attributing the
repeated narrowing of disqualification standards enacted by Congress to "self-
dealing" by judges).
223. Telephone conversation with William Weisenberg, Chair of the ABA
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, March 4, 2011. From 2007 to
2009, I served as consultant to and director of the ABA Judicial Disqualification
Project, under the auspices of the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial
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underlying Report upon which it was based, was withdrawn
following objections from representatives of the ABA's Judicial
Division (and other ABA entities).224 Unlike the ABA, Congress
and state legislatures may be willing to enact procedural reform in
the teeth of objections from judges, but then, administration of the
new procedures will once again fall to those same judges.
Focusing on the proposed reforms themselves, some will be
easier than others to implement without provoking an allergic
reaction from the judiciary. For example, a rule that entitles both
parties to be heard in disqualification proceedings by a judge who
must give a reasoned explanation for her rulings does not impugn the
presumption of impartiality and should not implicate the
disqualification paradox (although judges who think disqualification
practice is driven by lawyers angling for strategic advantage may
still object to such procedures as an unnecessary waste of time). The
same is true of proposals to replace disqualified high court judges.
Peremptory challenge procedures are a mixed bag. Judges for whom
such a procedure implies bias among jurists may construe procedural
requirements strictly; on the other hand, if substitution is automatic
and unencumbered by an implication that the targeted judge is less
than impartial (e.g., because no attestation of bias is required), judges
may accept peremptory challenge procedures without resistance.
More likely to encounter resistance are proposals that convey
skepticism of judicial motives and impartiality, which implicate the
judicial disqualification paradox directly. Assigning disqualification
motions to a different judge implies that the target judge cannot be
trusted to rule impartially; subjecting non-disqualification to a de
novo standard of appellate review implies that no deference is due
the trial judge's assessment of her own fitness; and establishing a
mechanism to review non-disqualification by appellate judges
implies that appellate judges cannot be trusted to have the final word
on their own impartiality. If these proposals are imposed upon a
skeptical judiciary, judges may once again implement them less
rigorously than rule-makers intend. Fellow judges may err on the
side of non-disqualification when ruling on motions to disqualify
colleagues; appellate courts may impose an implicitly deferential
Independence. In my capacity as present and former project consultant/director, I
was privy to events described in the text accompanying notes 223 and 224, as
corroborated by Chairman Weisenberg in our telephone conversation.
224. Id.
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standard of "de novo" review; and judges assigned to review the
non-disqualification of appellate colleagues may likewise do so with
undue deference.
The long-term solution lies in managing the judiciary's
chronic ambivalence to disqualification. Such ambivalence cannot
and should not be eliminated altogether. As long as "good" judges
are women and men who strive to look and be impartial, then asking
them to disqualify themselves or colleagues who are or appear less
than impartial-and implicitly, less than "good"-is something that
judges will do reluctantly. By design, the appearances-based
disqualification regime enables judges to disqualify themselves or
their brethren for an appearance of partiality without the need to find
or concede actual bias. But that is not enough to overcome judicial
ambivalence, if conceding an appearance of partiality is tantamount
to conceding an appearance of impropriety. The two will be
synchronous whenever a judge makes inappropriate statements, or
engages in inappropriate conduct that calls her impartiality into
question. In these situations, judicial ambivalence to disqualification
is, to some extent, inherent and inevitable. There is an even broader
array of situations, however, in which the appearance of partiality is
created by conduct that is not improper and does not give rise to an
appearance of impropriety. Such will be the case whenever harmless
relationships, associations, and life experiences put the judge's
impartiality in doubt, under circumstances unique to a given case. In
these situations, ambivalence may nonetheless persist, insofar as the
judge is put on the defensive by a motion to disqualify which calls
her out for an appearance problem she failed to fix by recusing sua
sponte.
Assigning disqualification motions to a different judge will
avoid self-interested judges "grading their own papers" but may not
overcome the ambivalence judges feel about questioning the
impartiality of colleagues. 22 5 Overcoming ambivalence requires that
judges more fully appreciate the dual psychological impediments to
judicial self-evaluation: that judges (like the general population)
have difficulty detecting their own biases, and that judges see
themselves differently than others see them. Because of this, judges
can misperceive how their conduct "reasonably" appears to the
225. One study found that judges were, if anything, more reluctant to
recommend the disqualification of a colleague than themselves. SHAMAN &
GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 145, at 42.
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public. Thus, when innocuous conduct gives rise to an appearance
of partiality that triggers the need for disqualification, no inference
of impropriety should arise from the underlying conduct or from the
judge's failure to appreciate the perception problems she created.
When judicial conduct creates both an appearance of partiality and
an appearance of impropriety, those same psychological
impediments may disable the errant judge from appreciating the
appearance problems she has caused. There should be no dishonor
in that, even if the underlying conduct is unacceptable and must be
called to the judge's attention.
The simple-seeming solution of openly acknowledging the
psychological impediments to judicial self-evaluation is complicated
by its profound implications. The traditional view of the judicial
role, reinforced by codes of conduct and the judiciary's institutional
culture, is that judges are independent and impartial men and women
of integrity who uphold and apply the law and disregard extralegal
influences. To concede a susceptibility to real or perceived bias, and
a psychological blind spot to detecting it, is in obvious tension with
this traditional view.
Recent social science research has shown us that judicial
decision-making is subject to a host of influences: law, political
ideology, motivated reasoning, strategic considerations, the audience
for whom the judge is writing, the desire for elevation to higher
judicial office, and-the focus of this article-bias.22 6 Whereas the
legal establishment and its detractors implicitly characterize the
proper judicial role in dichotomous terms-good judges follow the
law, while bad judges succumb to extralegal influences-reality is
much more complicated. From a regulatory perspective, a more
realistic approach is to recognize that influences on judicial decision-
making lie on a continuum, from the desirable to the intolerable.
The goal of judicial oversight generally, should be to manage
extralegal influences in ways that minimize the unacceptable. The
goal of disqualification, in turn, should be to draw a line on that
continuum, where the threat of unacceptable extralegal influences
compromises the fairness-real or perceived-of a given
proceeding.
If the legal establishment re-conceptualizes the nature of
legal and extralegal influences on judicial decision-making in terms
226. WHAT'S LAw GOT To Do WITH IT?, supra note 172.
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of a continuum instead of a dichotomy, the prognosis for the
proposed procedural regime improves dramatically. Once judges
acknowledge that the best among them are subject to extralegal
influences, including bias, and that it is extremely difficult for a
judge to accurately self-assess where her real or perceived biases fall
on a continuum, then procedural protections aimed at better detecting
and managing judicial bias become unobjectionable.
Procedural reform itself may aid in this acclimation process.
Imposing procedural rigor requires judges to be more exacting in
their approach to disqualification problems and in so doing conveys
to those judges a heightened institutional commitment to taking
disqualification problems seriously. If disqualification proceedings
are run more like other adjudicatory proceedings, in which
disinterested judges issue rulings accompanied by reasoned
explanations after adversarial argument, judges may more fully
accept judicial disqualification into the practice and procedure
mainstream.
The history of judicial resistance to disqualification
notwithstanding, the prospects for this re-conceptualization are
relatively bright. In Caperton, a majority of the Supreme Court-
albeit a bare one-underscored the unconscious nature of judicial
bias that renders it insusceptible to self-detection. Although the
Caperton Court reserved the application of its constitutional due
process analysis to exceptional cases, it emphasized that the states
were free to (and typically did) regulate real and perceived bias more
rigorously and routinely. In a similar vein, a significant minority of
jurisdictions have adopted meaningful peremptory challenge
procedures and procedures for reassigning disqualification requests
to other judges, which embody the view I am expounding. To
capitalize on the momentum Caperton created, the next step is to
create forums for judges from jurisdictions that have embraced such
procedures to share their experiences with judges from jurisdictions
that have not, and for judges generally to become more familiar with
recent research on the psychology of bias.
227. ABA Judicial Disqualification Project, supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
Symposium 2011] 731
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
V. CONCLUSION
A muscular presumption of impartiality suits a formalist
world in which the neutrality of judges is widely accepted as an
article of faith, and dissenters can be discounted as unreasonable
outliers. But in a modem world influenced by the lessons of legal
realism, where scholars and citizens alike entertain complex and
divergent views on how judges think, achieving a consensus on
when doubts about a judge's impartiality are "reasonable" becomes
ever more problematic. As a consequence, we are witnessing an
escalating battle over disqualification in a range of settings, where
judges who have internalized traditional presumptions of impartiality
and decline to disqualify themselves are being called out by litigants,
the media, and good government organizations that view the same
events in fundamentally different ways. In short, the appearances
paradigm is crumbling because it has been balkanized; it is
increasingly reasonable to draw divergent inferences from the same
events, for which reason regulating disqualification with reference to
how a judge's conduct appears to a reasonable person has become
increasingly unmanageable.
Against that backdrop, a resurrected and revitalized
procedural regime that seeks to promote public confidence in the
disqualification process, even if substantive disqualification
standards are applied inconsistently, holds considerable promise.
The prospects for a new procedural regime, however, turn on
whether judges are ready to accept the ethos of disqualification
embodied in procedures aimed at taking disqualification more
seriously or whether they will remain resistant in ways that lead
them to marginalize the new regime as they have its predecessors.
Recent developments, which manifest growing awareness among
judges of the complex psychology of judicial bias, are encouraging,
but time will tell.
[Vol. 30:4732
